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en years ago, the United States offered only two diversion 
courts exclusively for defendants who had served in the Armed 
Forces: one in Anchorage, Alaska, and the other in Buffalo, New 
York.1 In the intervening decade, however, such courts have emerged 
in more than 300 jurisdictions across the nation.2 By immersing 
veterans in a climate that focuses on individualized treatment rather 
than mere punishment, these courts aim to accomplish perhaps the most 
fundamental objective of the American criminal justice system: to 
thoroughly and humanely rehabilitate offenders so that they turn away 
from their past criminality and improve their lives and the lives of 
others around them in a civil society.3 According to virtually all 
published accounts, these judicial bodies—typically labeled “Veterans 
Treatment Courts”—have achieved resounding success in carrying out 
their prescribed mission.4 More than 10,000 justice-involved veterans 
1 See Jack W. Smith, The Anchorage, Alaska Veterans Court and Recidivism: July 6, 
2004–December 31, 2010, 29 ALASKA L. REV. 93, 93–98, 100–02 (2012); Matthew 
Daneman, N.Y. Court Gives Veterans Chance to Straighten Out, USA TODAY (June 1, 2008, 
9:03 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-06-01-veterans-court_N.htm; 
Neale Gulley, Nation’s First Veterans Court Counts Its Successes, REUTERS (Jan. 9, 2011, 
12:04 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-court-veterans-idUSTRE7082U020110109; 
J.P. Lawrence, Veterans Treatment Courts, Explained, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS 
(Sept. 29, 2016), http://www.expressnews.com/militarycity/article/Veterans-treatment-
courts-explained-9447254.php (last updated Oct. 3, 2016, 2:47 PM). 
2 Rachel Martin, Hundreds of Veterans Treatment Courts See Success but More Are 
Needed, NPR (Jan. 3, 2017, 5:09 AM), http://www.npr.org/2017/01/03/507983947/special-
courts-for-military-veterans-gain-traction. 
3 See Tiffany Cartwright, “To Care for Him Who Shall Have Borne the Battle”: The 
Recent Development of Veterans Treatment Courts in America, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 
295, 299–303 (2011); Michael Daly Hawkins, Coming Home: Accommodating the Special 
Needs of Military Veterans to the Criminal Justice System, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 563, 573 
(2010); Michael L. Perlin, “John Brown Went Off to War”: Considering Veterans Courts 
as Problem-Solving Courts, 37 NOVA L. REV. 445, 456–64, 477 (2013); Kristina Shevory, 
Why Veterans Should Get Their Own Courts, ATLANTIC (Dec. 2011), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/12/why-veterans-should-get-their-
own-courts/308716/.  
4 See, e.g., Jillian M. Cavanaugh, Helping Those Who Serve: Veterans Treatment Courts 
Foster Rehabilitation and Reduce Recidivism for Offending Combat Veterans, 45 NEW ENG. 
L. REV. 463, 474–81 (2011); Daniel R. Devoy, Unconventional Rehabilitation: Military
Members’ Right to Veterans Treatment Court, 56 JUDGES J. 14, 14–16 (2017); Kraig J.
Knudsen & Scott Wingenfeld, A Specialized Treatment Court for Veterans with Trauma
Exposure: Implications for the Field, 52 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 127 (2016);
Robert T. Russell, Veterans Treatment Courts: A Proactive Approach, 35 NEW ENG. J.
CRIM. L. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 357, 370–72 (2009); Jennifer McDermott, 5 Years Later,
Veterans Treatment Court Is a Success Story, WASH. TIMES (May 22, 2016),
T 
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have passed through Veterans Treatment Courts in the past ten years, 
with the majority of them returning to their communities committed to 
living their lives in a positive, productive, and law-abiding manner.5  
Amid this rapid proliferation of Veterans Treatment Courts, 
however, some growing problems have emerged below the surface of 
this well-intended and seemingly effective model of rehabilitative 
justice.6 As more jurisdictions develop Veterans Treatment Courts, the 
miscellany of individual court practices, procedures, standards, and 
objectives increases as well.7 A minority of states has statutorily 
established at least a baseline mandate of the mission and scope of 
Veterans Treatment Courts.8 All other jurisdictions leave the critical 
decisions about the maintenance and operations of these courts solely 
in the hands of judicial and administrative bodies, generally providing 
expansive room for each Veterans Treatment Court to essentially 
govern itself.9 Even in states that have enacted laws regulating aspects 
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/may/22/5-years-later-veterans-treatment-
court-is-a-succes/; Martin, supra note 2.  
5 See LAURIE A. DRAPELA, CLARK COUNTY VETERANS TREATMENT COURT: FINAL 
REPORT AND PROGRAM RECOMMENDATIONS 16–18 (Oct. 2014), https://www.clark.wa. 
gov/sites/all/files/district-court/Specialty%20Courts/2014VTCFinal.pdf; Robert T. Russell, 
Veterans Treatment Courts, 31 TOURO L. REV. 385, 397 (2015); Heath Druzin, Having 
Veterans as Mentors Is Key to Treatment Court Success Stories, STARS & STRIPES 
(July 29, 2015), https://www.stripes.com/having-veterans-as-mentors-is-key-to-treatment-
court-success-stories-1.360274; Melissa Fitzgerald, A Tale of Two Brothers, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Nov. 11, 2014, 9:45 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/melissa-fitzgerald/a-tale-
of-two-brothers_b_6135760.html; Ines Novacic, For Veterans in Legal Trouble, Special 
Courts Can Help, CBS NEWS (Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/for-
veterans-legal-trouble-special-courts-can-help/ (updated Nov. 16, 2015, 10:12 AM). 
Typically, Veterans Treatment Courts use the phrase “justice-involved veteran” to describe 
any veteran accepted into the court’s treatment program, preferring this term over the more 
traditional criminal court designation of “defendant.” See generally Sean Clark & Jim 
McGuire, PTSD and the Law: An Update, PTSD RES. Q. (2011), https://www.ptsd.va.gov/ 
publications/rq_docs/v22n1.pdf (using this phrase in sentences where a description of a 
conventional criminal court would use the word “defendant”). This Article honors this 
preference, using the phrase “justice-involved veteran” rather than “defendant” when 
referring to veterans in the criminal justice system.  
6 See Sohil Shah, Comment, Authorization Required: Veterans Treatment Courts, the 
Need for Democratic Legitimacy, and the Separation of Powers Doctrine, 23 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 67, 67–68, 105–06 (2014). 
7 Benjamin Pomerance, The Best-Fitting Uniform: Balancing Legislative Standards and 
Judicial Processes in Veterans Treatment Courts, 18 WYO. L. REV. 179, 182, 192–93 
(2018).  
8 See Claudia Arno, Comment, Proportional Response: The Need for More—and More 
Standardized—Veterans’ Courts, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1039, 1040–42 (2015); Shah, 
supra note 6.  
9 Pomerance, supra note 7, at 182. 
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of the conduct of Veterans Treatment Courts, there typically exists 
plenty of leeway for an individual court to render high-impact decisions 
about its own operations.10  
To an important extent, this level of freedom that each Veterans 
Treatment Court enjoys is necessary for the proper functioning of a 
therapeutic plan of justice.11 Individualized action plans stand at the 
center of a Veterans Treatment Court’s success.12 Rather than 
attempting to employ cookie-cutter, one-size-fits-all approaches to 
rehabilitation, Veterans Treatment Courts first recognize each justice-
involved veteran as a unique person who has confronted unique 
experiences before, during, and after military service, and then tailor a 
treatment strategy based on that veteran’s specific needs.13 To keep this 
vital individualization alive, Veterans Treatment Courts must never 
become overregulated and homogenized.14  
A complete lack of standardization, however, poses substantial legal 
and practical concerns.15 Currently, basic criteria often vary 
significantly among Veterans Treatment Courts within the same 
state.16 The components of a Veterans Treatment Court in any given 
county can be quite different from the components of a Veterans 
Treatment Court situated in an adjoining county.17 For example, a 
justice-involved veteran who would be eligible for admission into a 
Veterans Treatment Court in County A might not be eligible for 
10 See id.; Arno, supra note 8. 
11 See Shah, supra note 6, at 81–82. But see William E. Raferty, Despite Being Vetoed 
Three Times, California Legislature Debates Bill Regarding Creation of Veterans Courts, 
GAVEL TO GAVEL (Mar. 5, 2015), http://gaveltogavel.us/2015/03/05/despite-being-vetoed-
3-times-california-legislature-debates-bill-regarding-creation-of-veterans-courts/ (Nat’l
Ctr. for State Courts, Williamsburg, Va.).
12 See Cartwright, supra note 3, at 303–07. 
13 See Julie Marie Baldwin, Investigating the Programmatic Attack: A National Survey 
of Veterans Treatment Courts, 105 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 705, 714–15 (2015).  
14 For example, in November 2015, a seventeen-member committee from the Uniform 
Law Commission began drafting a model Veterans Treatment Court Act. VETERANS COURT 
ACT (VETERANS AND SERVICEMEMBERS TREATMENT COURT ACT) (NAT’L CONFERENCE 
OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, Draft 2015) (later renamed Model Veterans Treatment 
Court Act). Although this model established a definite framework within which a Veterans 
Treatment Court judge needed to operate, the drafters of this model act ensured that the 
judges presiding over Veterans Treatment Courts maintained an appropriate level of 
discretion over their courtroom. See Pomerance, supra note 7, at 224–27.  
15 Allison L. Jones, Comment, Veterans Treatment Courts: Do Status-Based Problem-
Solving Courts Create an Improper Privileged Class of Criminal Defendants?, 43 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL’Y 307, 310 (2013).  
16 See id. 
17 See id.; see also Arno, supra note 8. 
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admission into a Veterans Treatment Court in County B.18 From a 
practical viewpoint, these wide-ranging variances lead to problematic 
confusion among the general public about what the “Veterans 
Treatment Court” label truly means, as justice-involved veterans who 
are eligible to use the services of certain Veterans Treatment Courts are 
unequivocally barred from entering others.19  
From a legal standpoint, these elemental distinctions from one court 
to another are even more troubling. Through these classification-based 
variances, states risk breaching the command of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, which orders that no 
state shall deny “equal protection of the laws” to any person within its 
jurisdiction.20 When an individual Veterans Treatment Court decides 
that a certain class of justice-involved veterans is ineligible for the 
services and advantages the court affords, questions inherently emerge 
about whether this particular Veterans Treatment Court is engaging in 
the type of classification-based discrimination that the Equal Protection 
Clause forbids.21 The same queries persist when states enact statutes 
that openly ban particular classes of veterans from gaining access to 
these courts.22 When it becomes difficult to comprehend what 
legitimate interest(s) the government may advance by drawing these 
lines, the questions about the presence of potential Equal Protection 
Clause violations naturally grow louder.23  
Already, commentators have successfully demonstrated that the 
most basic classification distinction that Veterans Treatment Courts 
institute—accepting veterans, excluding nonveterans—passes 
constitutional muster.24 Tribunals have also firmly declared that 
admission into a Veterans Treatment Court is a privilege, not a legal 
18 See Arno, supra note 8.  
19 Pomerance, supra note 7, at 202–05.  
20 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
21 See Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by 
Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 780 (1987) (“Today scholars understand the equal 
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to require that the government treat all 
persons similarly situated in a similar manner.”).  
22 See Jeremy B. Smith, Note, The Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite: Why the Supreme 
Court Should Acknowledge Its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based 
on Sexual Orientation, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2771–72 (2005).  
23 See infra Part IV. 
24 E.g., Eric Merriam, Non-Uniform Justice: An Equal Protection Analysis of Veterans 
Treatment Courts’ Exclusionary Qualification Requirements, 84 MISS. L.J. 685, 717 (2015). 
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right.25 Nevertheless, government actors cannot impose arbitrary, 
classification-based distinctions, even when eligibility for the program 
at issue is implicitly limited to only a particular subset of the total 
population.26 Therefore, as the Veterans Treatment Court movement in 
the United States continues to grow from coast to coast, it is crucial to 
scrutinize the categorizations established by many of these courts 
through the lens of the Equal Protection Clause.27 
This Article fills a gap in the existing legal scholarship by 
conducting this Equal Protection Clause examination. Part I provides 
an overview of the basic Veterans Treatment Court model and 
describes classification-based eligibility criteria that frequently differ 
among various courts. Part II discusses the appropriate legal framework 
for evaluating classification-based distinctions that Veterans Treatment 
Courts often use when determining eligibility and ultimately concludes 
that rational basis review is the proper standard to apply in such 
instances. Part III summarizes the history of rational basis review, 
points out the practical uncertainties of this court-made test, and 
addresses some of the ways that the judiciary has historically resolved 
these ambiguities. Lastly, Part IV applies the rational basis test to 
several classification-based distinctions that Veterans Treatment 
Courts commonly draw when determining which veterans are eligible 
for their services, which proves that some of these classifications 
cannot satisfy even this low-level standard of review. In doing so, this 
Article does not diminish the important role that Veterans Treatment 
Courts have played for the past decade in positively transforming the 
lives of justice-involved veterans throughout this nation. Instead, this 
Article aims to strengthen the work and the impact of current and future 
Veterans Treatment Courts and ensure that all these unique judicial 
entities adhere fully to the standards of “equal protection of the laws” 
that the Constitution guarantees. 
25 Id. at 714; see also Veterans Court, LAW FOR VETERANS, http://www.lawforveterans. 
org/veterans-courts (last visited Jan. 9, 2019) (“It is important to remember, no veteran has 
a ‘right’ to have their case assigned to Veterans Court. Once in Veterans Court, the veteran 
must continuously ‘earn’ the privilege of remaining in Veterans Court by complying with 
all the Court’s requirements.”).  
26 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
669 (3d ed. 2006).  
27 See Merriam, supra note 24, at 698 (“Given the potential significant advantages of 
participation in [Veterans Treatment Courts] over the normal criminal process, equal 
protection challenges from those excluded from participation are inevitable.”).  
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I 
A VARIED LANDSCAPE: 
GLARING CONTRASTS AMONG VETERANS TREATMENT COURTS 
Veterans Treatment Courts throughout the nation use a model that 
seems quite familiar on the surface.28 For a couple of decades before 
the first Veterans Treatment Courts began, jurisdictions across the 
United States had operated drug treatment courts using the same basic 
principles: identify strong candidates for rehabilitation and offer an 
opportunity for them to complete an individualized, multistep 
treatment program developed by a team of experts as an alternative to 
incarceration.29 In most Veterans Treatment Courts, as with most Drug 
Treatment Courts, the court assigns each participant a mentor to help 
guide him or her through the entire treatment process and further 
provides support from alcohol and substance abuse specialists, social 
workers, employment counselors, and other professionals.30 Unlike a 
conventional criminal court setting, the prosecutor and defense counsel 
do not function as adversaries but rather as co-advocates working 
together for the defendant’s ultimate success.31 Sobriety throughout the 
duration of the treatment process is expected, which is evidenced by 
the defendant receiving randomly administered tests for detecting drug 
and alcohol use.32 Court appearances occur often, with each treatment 
team member updating the presiding judge about the defendant’s 
progress through the steps of the defendant’s individualized treatment 
28 See Diana Moga, 9 Questions with a Veterans Treatment Court Judge, TASK  
& PURPOSE (July 11, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://taskandpurpose.com/9-questions-veteran-
treatment-court-judge. 
29 See Ryan S. King & Jill Pasquarella, Drug Courts: A Review of the Evidence, THE 
SENTENCING PROJECT 1–2 (Apr. 2009), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2016/01/Drug-Courts-A-Review-of-the-Evidence.pdf.  
30 See Hawkins, supra note 3, at 565; Arno, supra note 8, at 1048; see also Baldwin, 
supra note 13, at 714.  
31 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Eric Holder Delivers 
Remarks at the Roanoke Veterans Treatment Court Program (Jan. 23, 2014), https://www. 
justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-delivers-remarks-roanoke-veterans-
treatment-court-program [hereinafter Holder Remarks].  
32 What Is a Veterans Treatment Court?, JUSTICE FOR VETS, http://www.justiceforvets. 
org/what-is-a-veterans-treatment-court (last visited Jan. 13, 2019). Not every Veterans 
Treatment Court, however, demands randomly administered drug and alcohol tests, and a 
significant number of Veterans Treatment Courts do not require any testing at all. Baldwin, 
supra note 13, at 743.  
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plan.33 Successful completion of the entire treatment plan permits that 
defendant to receive a lesser punishment and, in some circumstances, 
no further punishment at all.34 On the other hand, failure to meet the 
treatment plan’s requirements to the satisfaction of the presiding judge 
and the treatment team can lead to the defendant’s return to the 
traditional criminal court system and the imposition of more severe 
sanctions, including incarceration.35 
Yet Veterans Treatment Courts differ from Drug Treatment Courts 
in their emphasis on symbols, phrases, structures, and cultural norms 
that are emblematic of military life.36 In doing so, these courts hope to 
temporarily return justice-involved veterans to the military culture 
where they previously achieved some level of stability, regimentation, 
and success.37 In the words of one commentator, “The Veterans 
Treatment Court is the military unit: the judge becomes the 
Commanding Officer, the Veteran Mentors become fire team leaders, 
the court team becomes the company staff, and the veteran defendants 
become the troops.”38  
Customarily, all the mentors in Veterans Treatment Courts are 
veterans themselves, and judges typically try to connect justice-
involved veterans with mentors who served in the same branch and era 
of service.39 Additionally, the other members of the treatment team 
possess a higher-than-average level of military cultural competency.40 
33 Veterans Treatment Court Resources, NAT’L INST. CORRECTIONS 51, http://nicic.gov/ 
library/026733 (last visited Jan. 13, 2019) (stating that best practices require biweekly court 
appearances for a justice-involved veteran beginning his or her treatment program). 
34 Baldwin, supra note 13, at 745; Pomerance, supra note 7, at 191–92.  
35 Jones, supra note 15, at 314; Hawkins, supra note 3, at 566.  
36 See Arno, supra note 8, at 1048. Veterans Treatment Courts were born when a Drug 
Treatment Court judge in Buffalo, New York, discovered that an emphasis on these aspects 
could dramatically alter outcomes for justice-involved veterans who seemed otherwise 
unchangeable by the justice system. See Pomerance, supra note 7, at 183–85.  
37 See Mark A. McCormick-Goodhart, Note, Leaving No Veteran Behind: Policies and 
Perspectives on Combat Trauma, Veterans Courts, and the Rehabilitative Approach to 
Criminal Behavior, 117 PA. ST. L. REV. 895, 906–25 (2013); Tabatha Renz, Note, Veterans 
Treatment Court: A Hand Up Rather than Lock Up, 17 RICHLAND J.L. & PUB. INT. 697, 
698–700, 704–05 (2013); Dahlia Lithwick, Why Veterans Deserve Special Courts, 
NEWSWEEK (Feb. 10, 2010, 7:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/why-veterans-deserve-
special-courts-75257; Shevory, supra note 3.  
38 Veterans Court, OWASSO FOUNDATION, https://www.owassofoundation.org/ 
veterans-court/ (last visited Mar. 3, 3019). 
39 See Arno, supra note 8, at 1048–49. 
40 See Jones, supra note 15, at 314–15 (describing this enhanced military cultural 
competency as one of the most important policy rationales for establishing a Veterans 
Treatment Court). 
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The treatment team recognizes military-related conditions that could 
contribute to a veteran committing a crime—including, but certainly 
not limited to, service-connected post-traumatic stress disorder, 
traumatic brain injury, or military sexual trauma—and knows how to 
effectively treat such conditions for veterans.41 Additionally, Veterans 
Treatment Courts customarily serve as “one-stop shops” for connecting 
justice-involved veterans with the benefits, programs, and services 
available to them because of their military service.42 Since a 
surprisingly high percentage of veterans are unaware of the full range 
of benefits, programs, and services for which they are eligible, these 
revelations can produce life-changing outcomes for veterans and their 
families in vital areas, including financial compensation, healthcare 
services, educational opportunities, and employment preferences.43 
However, although the basic framework of Veterans Treatment 
Courts typically remains constant from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, 
41 See id.; Shah, supra note 6, at 71–80 (discussing the unique challenges that many 
veterans confront and summarizing the ways that Veterans Treatment Courts successfully 
address these challenges).  
42 See KIERRA ZOELLICK, AM. U. SCH. PUB. AFF., THE ROLE OF VETERANS JUSTICE 
OUTREACH SPECIALISTS IN VETERANS TREATMENT COURTS (2016), http://www.american. 
edu/spa/jpo/videos/upload/The-Role-of-Veterans-Justice-Outreach-Specialists-in-VTCs-
Fact-Sheet.pdf; Matt Stiner, Veterans Service Organizations in Veterans Treatment Courts: 
Coming to the Aid of Their Fellow Veterans, JUSTICE FOR VETS (July 2012), 
https://justiceforvets.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Dispatch-VSOs-in-VTCs.pdf. 
43 See, e.g., Chris Adams, VA Outreach Lags as Many Veterans Unaware of Benefits, 
MCCLATCHY (Nov. 19, 2012, 3:14 PM), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/ 
national/article24740527.html (updated June 17, 2015, 11:33 AM); Mary Kane, Vets, Don’t 
Miss Out on “Hidden Benefits,” KIPLINGER (June 2017), https://www.kiplinger.com/article/ 
retirement/T020-C000-S004-vets-don-t-miss-out-on-hidden-benefits.html. Title 38 of the 
United States Code is filled with statutes governing benefits, programs, and services for 
which veterans who provided active duty military service and were discharged under 
conditions other than dishonorable may be eligible. 38 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2012). For 
example, veterans with a disability that was incurred in military service or exacerbated by 
such service are eligible for tax-free disability compensation payments from the VA. See 38 
U.S.C. § 1110 (2012); 38 C.F.R. § 4.19 (2018). Low-income veterans who served during a 
wartime period may be eligible for a monthly tax-free VA pension. See Benjamin 
Pomerance, Fighting on Too Many Fronts: Concerns Facing Elderly Veterans in Navigating 
the United States Department of Veterans Affairs Benefits System, 37 HAMLINE L. REV. 19, 
26–31 (2014). Veterans seeking to pursue education at a college, university, or vocational 
program can receive substantial financial assistance to defray the costs of tuition, books and 
supplies, and housing through the G.I. Bill. CASSANDRIA DORTCH, CONG. RES. SERV., THE 
POST-9/11 GI BILL: A PRIMER 2‒3 (July 28, 2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42755.pdf 
(updated Aug. 1, 2018). This is just the very tip of the iceberg of possible benefits, programs, 
and services that could be available to a veteran.  
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many crucial distinctions exist among these courts.44 Some of the most 
critical distinctions focus on which veterans may be eligible for the 
services that these courts provide.45 For instance, a substantial number 
of Veterans Treatment Courts will accept only justice-involved 
veterans who received an honorable discharge from the armed forces.46 
Other Veterans Treatment Courts, however, will accept justice-
involved veterans regardless of the character of service listed upon their 
discharge paperwork.47 Certain courts demand that the veteran 
demonstrate a nexus between his or her criminal offense and his or her 
experiences in the military, while other courts impose no such 
requirement.48 In some jurisdictions, Veterans Treatment Courts will 
accept only veterans who served on active duty in a combat zone, yet 
in other jurisdictions Veterans Treatment Courts are willing to accept 
noncombat veterans.49 
Another area of contention focuses on what cases a Veterans 
Treatment Court may consider hearing.50 Most jurisdictions maintain 
a list of criminal offenses that unequivocally prohibit the transfer of a 
case from a traditional criminal court into a Veterans Treatment 
Court.51 In some locations, domestic violence charges automatically 
ban a veteran from Veterans Treatment Court eligibility, but other 
Veterans Treatment Courts will consider admitting these cases.52 In 
certain jurisdictions, Veterans Treatment Courts will not hear a case 
involving any offense in which a firearm was involved, including 
nonviolent weapons possession crimes.53 Furthermore, so-called 
simple assault offenses, such as a bar fight in which the veteran never 
44 See, e.g., Baldwin, supra note 13, at 738–50 (showing Veterans Treatment Court 
statistics). 
45 See infra notes 46–56.  
46 Baldwin, supra note 13, at 742. 
47 Id.  
48 See Jones, supra note 15, at 318.  
49 William H. McMichael, The Battle on the Home Front: Special Courts Turn to Those 
Who Served to Help Troubled Vets Regain Discipline, Camaraderie, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2011, 
at 47. 
50 See Devoy, supra note 4, at 15 (unlike many Veterans Treatment Courts, Santa Clara 
County does not exclude veterans due to seriousness of the crime and accepts both 
misdemeanor and felony cases).  
51 See id. 
52 Linda J. Fresneda, Note, The Aftermath of International Conflicts: Veterans Domestic 
Violence Cases and Veterans Treatment Courts, 37 NOVA L. REV. 631, 647–48 (2013); 
Pamela Kravetz, Note, Way Off Base: An Argument Against Intimate Partner Violence 
Cases in Veterans Treatment Courts, 4 VETERANS L. REV. 162, 204–05 (2012).  
53 See Cartwright, supra note 3, at 312. 
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used a weapon to attack the victim, are permitted in certain Veterans 
Treatment Courts but excluded from others.54 Certain Veterans 
Treatment Courts exclude any veteran facing a traffic offense charge.55 
Finally, some Veterans Treatment Courts refuse all cases that concern 
a crime involving any form of violence or threat of violence, while 
others frequently accept cases that concern a crime involving 
violence.56 
All these distinctions segregate justice-involved veterans into two 
distinct classes: those veterans who may receive the benefits of 
Veterans Treatment Courts and those veterans who are barred from 
receiving such benefits.57 With the establishment of so many 
government-imposed classification-based schemes comes the potential 
for violations of the Equal Protection Clause, as each of these 
classifications provides distinct advantages to certain justice-involved 
veterans while automatically excluding others.58 The question 
concerning this Article, and the question that should concern all 
policymakers involved with the formation and operation of Veterans 
Treatment Courts, is whether a court may find that any of these 
categorical segregations run afoul of the constitutional pledge to 
provide “equal protection of the laws.”59 To make this determination, 
one must first examine what legal standard of review applies to a 
classification-based scheme affecting justice-involved veterans’ access 
to Veterans Treatment Court.60 
54 See Arno, supra note 8, at 1061; Perlin, supra note 3, at 458. 
55 Baldwin, supra note 13, at 742. 
56 See Megan McCloskey, Veterans Court Takes a Chance on Violent Offenders, STARS 
& STRIPES (Sept. 14, 2010), https://www.stripes.com/veterans-court-takes-a-chance-on-
violent-offenders-1.118182.  
57 See Merriam, supra note 24, at 698. Importantly, these are not the only potentially 
problematic disparities. Significant differences also exist regarding the requirements to 
remain in and graduate from a Veterans Treatment Court’s program. Baldwin, supra note 
13, at 743–44. Additional considerations emerge when considering the legal impact of a 
veteran’s graduation from a Veterans Treatment Court’s assigned program. Id. at 745. These 
disparities, while beyond the scope of the examination conducted in this Article, could also 
raise significant Fourteenth Amendment concerns. See Merriam, supra note 24, at 698‒99. 
58 Merriam, supra note 24, at 698–99. 
59 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4. 
60 Infra Part II.  
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II 
SETTING THE STANDARD: 
THE IMMENSE LIKELIHOOD OF RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW 
Originally, American lawmakers enacted the Fourteenth 
Amendment for one primary purpose: to abolish discrimination in the 
immediate post–Civil War era against African Americans who 
formerly were slaves.61 Approximately eighty years later, however, the 
United States Supreme Court articulated that the protections of this 
amendment, including the equal protection safeguard, extended to all 
the nation’s citizens, not just to racial and ethnic minorities.62 Since 
that time, the judiciary’s interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause 
have evolved to consider a broader variety of government-imposed 
classification plans as questionable.63 If a party brings a legal challenge 
against the government’s classification-based scheme, this broader 
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause permits a review of the 
rationale and the impact of the classification.64 
Many of these challenges, however, ultimately prove to be 
unsuccessful.65 Merely enacting a classification-based statute does not 
automatically mean that the government has violated the letter or the 
spirit of the Equal Protection Clause.66 As former United States 
Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist accurately observed, 
“All laws classify, and, unremarkably, the characteristics that 
distinguish the classes so created have been judged relevant by the 
61 The extent to which the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment intended this text to 
apply to any individuals other than the freed slaves has been, and may always be, the object 
of significant debate. Compare Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71 (1872) (limiting the 
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment to former slaves), and Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 
162, 165, 174–78 (1875) (refusing to extend the Fourteenth Amendment to guard against 
discriminatory actions on the basis of gender), with Richard L. Aynes, Unintended 
Consequences of the Fourteenth Amendment and What They Tell Us About Its 
Interpretation, 39 AKRON L. REV. 289, 303 (2006) (“It is very clear that the Equal Protection 
Clause was designed to protect ‘all persons.’”), and Garrett Epps, Interpreting the 
Fourteenth Amendment: Two Don’ts and Three Dos, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 433, 
441–44 (2007) (providing historical evidence indicating that the drafters never intended the 
Fourteenth Amendment to affect only the former slaves). 
62 Pettinga, supra note 21, at 780–81.  
63 Id. at 781.  
64 See id. 
65 See Smith, supra note 22, at 2773–74.  
66 Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135, 135 
(2011) (footnotes omitted) (“Despite the promise of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause, the state rarely treats people equally, and the Clause does not require it 
to do so. The government must simply justify any legal distinction between individuals with 
a sufficient rationale.”).  
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legislators responsible for the enactment.”67 More than a century of 
case law clarifies that the government is indeed permitted to engage in 
lawmaking that discriminates against certain classes of people as long 
as the government’s intentions in doing so are for the good of the 
people overall.68 
Consider, for instance, a law that forbids individuals under the age 
of twenty-one from purchasing and consuming alcoholic beverages. On 
its face, this statute is discriminatory.69 Using a particular 
classification—age—this law prevents certain people from enjoying an 
activity in which other people are able to engage freely.70 Nevertheless, 
laws establishing a minimum drinking age are not deemed to violate 
the Equal Protection Clause.71 The government’s interest in regulating 
the health and safety of young people and the overall societal benefit 
of newer drivers not having legal access to intoxicating drinks are 
deemed to outweigh the discriminatory impact of preventing younger 
people from buying and consuming alcoholic beverages.72  
Thus, the equal protection analysis of any classification-based 
statute does not cease with the mere presence of discrimination.73 
Instead, the legal question is far more nuanced and case specific, 
67 Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 39 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Michael J. 
Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 
1023, 1068 (1979) (“Every time an agency of government formulates a rule—in particular, 
every time it enacts a law—it classifies.”).  
68 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973) (“A 
century of Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause affirmatively 
supports the application of the traditional standard of review, which requires only that the 
State’s system be shown to bear some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes.”); 
Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 
341, 344–53 (1949).  
69 See Ronen Avraham, Kyle D. Logue & Daniel Schwarcz, Understanding Insurance 
Antidiscrimination Laws, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 195, 197 (2014) (“We discriminate when we 
draw distinctions between things and people. Individuals, corporations, and governments 
draw distinctions all the time, and in ways that are widely considered unobjectionable.”).  
70 See Kenneth W. Simons, Response, Discrimination Is a Comparative Injustice: A 
Reply to Hellman, 102 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 85, 88 (2006) (describing that the core principle 
of discrimination is the existence of some sort of classification-based distinction between 
persons, and that such discrimination becomes illegal when this distinction is unjustifiable). 
71 For several real-life examples of this rationale in Equal Protection Clause challenges 
to underage drinking statutes, see Thomas L. Hafemeister & Shelly L. Jackson, Effectiveness 
of Sanctions and Law Enforcement Practices Targeted at Underage Drinking Not Involving 
Operation of a Motor Vehicle, in REDUCING UNDERAGE DRINKING: A COLLECTIVE 
RESPONSIBILITY 532‒34 (Richard J. Bonnie & Mary Ellen O’Connell eds., 2004). 
72 See id.  
73 See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text. 
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requiring a balancing test between the discriminatory impact of the 
law’s categorization scheme and the government’s motivation in 
enacting it.74 If the government can achieve the law’s purported goals 
without engaging in discriminatory conduct toward the members of a 
particular class, then the law probably will not satisfy the equal 
protection requirement.75 On the other hand, if the government can 
accomplish a vital objective only by instituting some form of 
classification-based discrimination, then the law in question is 
extremely likely to withstand review under the Equal Protection 
Clause.76  
Further complications arise from the fact that not all forms of 
discrimination are treated equally under the Equal Protection Clause.77 
Although the text of the Equal Protection Clause itself does not call for 
a multilayered evaluation process, judges have developed three tiers of 
classification-based statutory discrimination, each of which receives a 
different standard of review.78 If a law introduces a classification 
scheme based on a “suspect class”—race, national origin, or certain 
forms of alien status (e.g., discrimination against documented aliens 
living within the United States)—or if the discrimination at issue 
impinges upon a “fundamental right” (such as the right to marry, the 
right to raise a family, or the right to interstate travel), then the statute 
must be “narrowly tailored” to achieve “a compelling governmental 
interest” to satisfy the Equal Protection Clause.79 If the law burdens a 
“quasi-suspect class”—gender and legitimacy of birth (e.g., 
discrimination against children who are born out of wedlock)—then the 
classification scheme must be “substantially related” to an “important 
74 See Pettinga, supra note 21, at 782–83.  
75 Id.  
76 Id.  
77 Id. at 784.  
78 See Smith, supra note 22, at 2772–77; see also Hans A. Linde, Due Process of 
Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 222 (1976) (addressing the fact that nothing in the text 
of the Constitution provides for, or even alludes to, the creation of this three-tiered method 
of review).  
79 Smith, supra note 22, at 2772–73; see Pettinga, supra note 21, at 782. Most 
commentators trace the creation of a more exacting review for government actions 
burdening a “suspect class” to the now-famous Footnote Four of United States v. Carolene 
Products Co., a 1938 decision concerning a federal statute banning filled milk. 304 U.S. 144 
(1938). The footnote, authored by Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, recommended a “more 
searching judicial inquiry” in any case or controversy where discrimination against “discrete 
and insular minorities” undermines “those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to 
protect minorities.” Id. at 152 n.4.  
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government purpose,” a less rigorous standard of review than the 
evaluation of discrimination against a suspect class.80 
If the statutory categorization does not affect a suspect class or a 
quasi-suspect class, then the classification scheme needs only to be 
“rationally related to any conceivable, legitimate government interest” 
to pass constitutional muster under the Equal Protection Clause.81 This 
level of review, known as the “rational basis test,” is far easier for the 
government to pass than the evaluations performed for suspect and 
quasi-suspect classes.82 Under the two heightened forms of legal 
scrutiny, the government bears the burden of demonstrating that the 
statutory classification plan satisfies the conditions of the applicable 
test.83 Rational basis review, on the other hand, places the burden on 
the petitioner to prove that a classification-based statute bears no 
rational relation to any legitimate governmental aim.84 Given the 
United States Supreme Court’s insistence that the government “has no 
obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory 
classification,”85 it is not surprising that the government typically 
80 Strauss, supra note 66, at 137. The hallmark United States Supreme Court case 
establishing intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate level of review for government actions 
discriminating on the basis of gender was Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).  
81 Smith, supra note 22, at 2773; see Pettinga, supra note 21, at 783. 
82 Jeffrey D. Jackson, Putting Rationality Back into the Rational Basis Test: Saving 
Substantive Due Process and Redeeming the Promise of the Ninth Amendment, 45 U. RICH. 
L. REV. 491, 493 (2011) (“The rational basis test as it currently stands is too weak. By
allowing any plausible reason for the legislation to suffice, whether or not it was a true
reason for the legislation, and by asking only whether lawmakers could have thought that it
was reasonably related to the subject it purported to advance, the Court has essentially made
the rational basis test equivalent to no test at all.”).
83 Smith, supra note 22, at 2772–73.  
84 Pettinga, supra note 21, at 783–84. 
85 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993). In fact, cases exist in which the Court 
blatantly recharacterized the stated purpose of the legislature to reach a finding of rationality. 
See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (converting the 
legislature’s purpose from eliminating advertising to merely limiting advertising). Class-
based schemes that discriminate far more than necessary to rationally accomplish the 
legislature’s stated objectives also typically satisfy the Court’s application of the rational 
basis test. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (stating that a 
class-based scheme must withstand rational basis review “if there is any reasonably 
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification,” and 
further declaring that this review “is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, 
or logic of legislative choices”); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) 
(“[R]ational distinctions [by a government entity] may be made with substantially less than 
mathematical exactitude [without failing the rational basis test].”); McGowan v. Maryland, 
366 U.S. 420, 425–26 (1961) (calling the legislation in question unartfully drawn but 
refusing to overturn it on Fourteenth Amendment grounds).  
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prevails in Equal Protection Clause challenges when the deciding 
tribunal applies rational basis review.86 
In theory, the judiciary could add new members to the existing list 
of suspect and quasi-suspect classes at any time, as these standards of 
review and the categories to which they apply are entirely judicially 
constructed.87 For decades, however, the United States Supreme Court 
has refused all opportunities to make this move.88 During this same 
time period, the Court has likewise rejected all requests to define new 
fundamental rights that would trigger the highest level of Equal 
Protection Clause scrutiny.89 The probability of the Court reversing 
course now for military veterans seems slim to none, especially when 
statutory-based classifications on the basis of so many other categories 
(such as age, socioeconomic status, sexual orientation, presence of 
physical or mental disabilities, and many others) have ample historical 
evidence of widespread discrimination but still receive only rational 
basis review.90 Similarly, the Court arguably once viewed access to the 
court system as a fundamental right in the Equal Protection Clause 
context. However, such a determination now appears to be a relic of 
the past, especially when considering a party’s access to a discretionary 
diversion court such as a Veterans Treatment Court.91 Although states 
may grant their citizens Equal Protection Clause safeguards beyond the 
protections of the federal government—such as California, 
Connecticut, and Iowa recognizing sexual orientation as a suspect class 
86 Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 760 (2011) 
(calling traditional rational basis review a “free pass” for the government).  
87 Linde, supra note 78; see Strauss, supra note 66, at 147. 
88 Yoshino, supra note 86, at 748. The last case to add a member to the classes that 
formally receive a more rigorous review was Trimble v. Gordon, in which the Court 
determined that class-based schemes burdening nonmarital children received heightened 
scrutiny. 430 U.S. 762, 766–76 (1977).  
89 Yoshino, supra note 86, at 748.  
90 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–32 (1996) (applying the rational basis 
test to a class-based scheme involving sexual orientation); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446–47 (1985) (refusing to apply a heightened form of scrutiny 
to a class-based scheme focusing on intellectual disabilities); Mass Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 
427 U.S. 307, 312–14 (1976) (applying the rational basis test to a categorical structure 
involving age); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 20–29 (1973) 
(subjecting certain class-based distinctions focusing on economic status to rational basis 
review).  
91 Merriam, supra note 24, at 713–16. 
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requiring the most stringent level of constitutional review—states that 
do so are still scarce in number.92  
Therefore, the evaluation of any challenge to a classification-based 
denial of access to a Veterans Treatment Court will almost certainly 
receive only rational basis review.93 Any justice-involved veteran 
bringing forth such a case will have to climb a perilously steep legal 
hill to receive a favorable outcome.94 Despite the pronounced 
deference that the rational basis test affords to the government, victory 
for an Equal Protection Clause petitioner remains possible.95 We now 
turn to an overview of the history of rational basis analysis to show that 
courts may still find a law violates the Equal Protection Clause even 
when applying this deferential standard of review.  
III 
DEFERENCE AND DEFIANCE: 
OVERCOMING THE ODDS IN RATIONAL BASIS ANALYSIS 
Between 1971 and 2014, the United States Supreme Court applied 
rational basis review in more than one hundred Equal Protection Clause 
challenges.96 In only seventeen of those cases, the Court found that the 
law in question failed the rational basis test and was thus held to be 
unconstitutional.97 Confronted with such odds, a petitioner could easily 
assume that his or her Equal Protection Clause claim is lost as soon as 
a judicial body decides to apply rational basis as the applicable standard 
of review.98  
Underscoring this conventional assumption is the Court’s insistence 
that “equal protection is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, 
fairness, or logic of legislative choices” and that the petitioner must 
negate “every conceivable basis which might support” a classification-
based scheme before the Court will consider invalidating the scheme 
92 Courtney A. Powers, Finding LGBTs a Suspect Class: Assessing the Political Power 
of LGBTs as a Basis for the Court’s Application of Heightened Scrutiny, 17 DUKE J. 
GENDER L. & POL’Y 385, 387 n.18 (2010).  
93 See supra notes 84–90 and accompanying text.  
94 See supra notes 78–84 and accompanying text.  
95 See infra Part III.  
96 Raphael Holoszyc-Pimentel, Note, Reconciling Rational Basis Review: When Does 
Rational Basis Bite?, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2070, 2071–72 (2015). 
97 Id.  
98 See Yoshino, supra note 86, at 747; Jackson, supra note 82. 
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under rational basis review.99 As long as the creators of the categorical 
discrimination “could rationally have decided that [the classification] 
might foster” a legitimate governmental aim, the Court will determine 
that the classification-based discrimination satisfies the Equal 
Protection Clause’s mandate.100 Surprisingly, a poor fit between the 
classification scheme and the government’s reasons for putting it forth 
may still survive this test, as the Court has determined that it can accept 
a discriminatory statute or policy “even when there is an imperfect fit 
between means and ends.”101 Perhaps even more shocking is the 
Court’s willingness under rational basis review to uphold statutes or 
policies even if the evidentiary materials supporting the government’s 
rationale for the discriminatory statute or policy were fundamentally 
flawed.102 In the face of this longstanding tradition of deference to the 
government, one can see why so many laws and other government 
actions remain unscathed after easily clearing this lowest of hurdles.103 
A. “Rational Basis with Bite”
Still, the Supreme Court and other judicial entities sometimes 
produce unexpected results even when applying this usually deferential 
test.104 Intermittently, and without any clear or consistent reasons why, 
courts will require the government to meet a more stringent threshold 
in practice despite applying rational basis as the legal standard of 
review.105 In these cases, the judiciary has refused to speculate about 
the government’s possible interests in enacting a classification-based 
statute or policy, instead letting the government explain what 
objectives it supposedly intended to accomplish.106 Additionally, the 
99 FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 315 (1993) (quoting Lehnhausen 
v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973)).
100 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981).
101 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993).
102 See, e.g., Holoszyc-Pimentel, supra note 96, at 2075.
103 See Andrew Ward, Note, The Rational-Basis Test Violates Due Process, 8 N.Y.U.
J.L. & LIBERTY 714, 721–24 (2014). See generally Aaron Belzer, Note, Putting the
“Review” Back in Rational Basis Review, 41 W. ST. U. L. REV. 339, 355–68 (2014); Robert
C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 1971 Term
Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 359 (1999); Jackson, supra note 82.
104 See Katie R. Eyer, The Canon of Rational Basis Review, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1317, 1356–69 (2018); Nan D. Hunter, Twenty-First Century Equal Protection: Making 
Law in an Interregnum, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 141, 148–53 (2006); Thomas B. Nachbar, 
Rational Basis “Plus,” 32 CONST. COMMENT. 449, 458–59, 463–64 (2017); Holoszyc-
Pimentel, supra note 96, at 2075.  
105 See Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151, 165 (2016). 
106 See supra notes 103–05 and accompanying text.  
2019] Rational Justice: Equal Protection Problems Amid Veterans 443 
Treatment Court Eligibility Categorizations
types of after-the-fact governmental rationalizations that satisfied the 
Supreme Court in plenty of conventional rational basis cases receive 
far less credibility by courts in these outlier cases.107 Situations where 
the government is unable to clearly articulate a close fit between the 
alleged objective of the law and the actual provisions and impacts of 
the statute also receive increased skepticism in these outlier 
decisions.108  
Commentators often refer to these unexpected and unexplained 
departures from the norm as “rational basis with bite.”109 To this day, 
the Supreme Court has never formally acknowledged the existence of 
rational basis with bite as a separate tier of Equal Protection Clause 
scrutiny, and the late Justice Antonin Scalia angrily rejected the notion 
that such a concept existed.110 However, the evidence of the Court’s 
occasional application of a noticeably more rigorous version of the 
rational basis test is indisputable.111  
Problematically, the Court’s use of rational basis with bite in Equal 
Protection Clause cases is erratic and unpredictable.112 Since the Court 
refuses to formally recognize the presence or the exact criteria of this 
test, neither the government nor the individual petitioners can know 
exactly when rational basis with bite will be or should be applied.113 
Without this sorely needed judicial guidance, all parties in an Equal 
Protection Clause dispute that does not implicate a fundamental right, 
suspect class, or quasi-suspect class, are left guessing whether the 
Court will go beyond the rigid deference of traditional rational basis 
analysis.114 While the need for this heightened level of examination of 
the government in certain cases is apparent, the vagueness that 
presently shrouds the Court’s application of rational basis with bite 
helps no one.115 
107 See Pettinga, supra note 21, at 779–80.  
108 See id.  
109 Brian L. Frye, Eldred & the New Rationality, 104 KY. L. REV. ONLINE (July 17, 
2015), http://www.kentuckylawjournal.org/index.php/2015/07/17/eldred-new-rationality/. 
110 Nachbar, supra note 104, at 450. Notably, however, Justice Scalia eventually 
retreated from this position, determining that the Court truly did apply a different level of 
rational basis review in certain cases. See id.  
111 See id.  
112 Farrell, supra note 103, at 415.  
113 Nachbar, supra note 104, at 450. 
114 Pettinga, supra note 21, at 779–80.  
115 See Farrell, supra note 103, at 415 (“This search for an underlying principle that 
would explain the results in the heightened rationality cases appears to be unsuccessful. . . . 
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B. Trends Regarding Rational Basis with Bite
Thankfully, commentators have devoted considerable time to trying 
to draw conclusions about what types of cases typically inspire rational 
basis with bite review.116 For instance, Raphael Holoszyc-Pimentel’s 
survey of Supreme Court decisions identified nine factors that appeared 
to recur often—although not uniformly—in cases where the Court 
applied some level of rational basis with bite: (1) the presence of a 
history of discrimination for the group(s) disadvantaged by the 
government action under review, (2) political powerlessness for the 
group(s) to challenge the law or policy in question, (3) the adversely 
affected group’s capacity to contribute to society, (4) classification on 
the basis of an immutable characteristic, (5) burden on a person’s 
significant right, (6) clear government animus toward the affected 
group(s), (7) federalism concerns, (8) discrimination of an unusual 
character, and (9) the government action’s ability to inhibit personal 
relationships.117 Of these nine factors, Holoszyc-Pimentel found that 
two—classification on the basis of an immutable characteristic and 
burdening a significant right—were particularly common in cases 
where the Court applied a form of rational basis with bite.118 Although 
some of the decisions that Holoszyc-Pimentel evaluated did not use 
either of these factors as a reason for employing more rigorous review, 
this study nevertheless indicates that achieving this less deferential 
analysis is more likely if the case involves classification based on a trait 
beyond the individual’s control or if the classification scheme burdens 
a significant right.119  
Delving deeper into these two most prevalent factors, Holoszyc-
Pimentel concluded that both discrimination on the basis of immutable 
traits and the risk of abridging significant rights ran contrary to the 
original reasons for enacting the Fourteenth Amendment.120 Initially, 
the amendment’s drafters purportedly sought to avoid misconduct 
targeting recently freed African Americans, a group that had long been 
legally disadvantaged due to a characteristic over which they had no 
control: the color of their skin.121 By extension, it was logical that 
Is it too much to ask that the Court decide cases consistently and predictably? Apparently 
the answer to this question is yes.”). 
116 See infra notes 117–34 and accompanying text.  
117 Holoszyc-Pimentel, supra note 96, at 2078–99 (explaining the nine factors). 
118 Id. at 2102.  
119 See id.  
120 See id. at 2103–05.  
121 See supra note 60.  
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“[l]egislation imposing special disabilities upon groups disfavored by 
virtue of circumstances beyond their control suggests the kind of ‘class 
or caste’ treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to 
abolish.”122  
In a separate study, Miranda Oshige McGowan concluded that the 
Court typically implemented rational basis with bite in cases where a 
majority of the Justices determined that the group bringing the Equal 
Protection Clause challenge had “been the target of discrimination.”123 
If the petitioner could demonstrate that the government exhibited a 
“bare . . . desire to harm” the group in question, then the Court would 
be more likely to hold the government to a considerably more stringent 
standard of review.124 This proposition was reinforced when the Court 
applied rational basis with bite to children who were undocumented 
aliens seeking to be educated in public schools, to hippies living in 
communes who were seeking food stamps, and to people with mental 
disabilities who were adversely affected by a city building code.125  
Other commentators have agreed with Professor McGowan’s 
conclusion, using these decisions and others to determine that a 
petitioner’s ability to prove “animus” against the adversely affected 
class is the critical threshold for predicting when the Court will apply 
rational basis with bite rather than traditional rational basis review.126 
Gerald Kerska goes as far as identifying two criteria that the Court 
typically examines when deciding whether a government action was an 
animus-based measure: (1) whether the classification scheme involved 
“the targeting of a distinct and disfavored social group and a break 
down in the democratic process,” and (2) whether the targeted group is 
one that is “suffering from longstanding or existing social stigma.”127  
Some writers argue that the Court conducts this more rigorous 
review whenever a majority of the Justices consider the discriminated 
122 Holoszyc-Pimentel, supra note 96, at 2102 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 
n.14 (1982)).
123 Miranda Oshige McGowan, Lifting the Veil on Rigorous Rational Basis Scrutiny, 96
MARQ. L. REV. 377, 387–94 (2012) (emphasis added). 
124 Id. at 389–90 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). 
125 Id. at 389–94.  
126 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT 148 (2001); Susannah W. Pollvogt, Windsor, Animus, and the Future of 
Marriage Equality, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 204, 205–06, 208 (2013); Kenji Yoshino, 
Why the Court Can Strike Down Marriage Restrictions Under Rational-Basis Review, 37 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 331, 336 (2013); Robinson, supra note 105. 
127 Gerald S. Kerska, Note, Economic Protectionism and Occupational Licensing 
Reform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1703, 1720–21 (2017).  
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group to be worthy of “quasi-suspect class” status.128 To these 
observers, rational basis with bite is a covert way for the Court to 
provide a form of heightened scrutiny without opening up the supposed 
Pandora’s box of adding new members to the quasi-suspect class 
list.129 Notably, not every rational basis with bite decision uses the 
same standards of review that members of a quasi-suspect class are 
guaranteed to receive.130 Still, the existence of a heightened analysis of 
rationality indicates that the Court may consider it a method of 
evaluating Equal Protection Clause challenges by groups lacking 
substantial political authority without deeming the groups part of a 
quasi-suspect class.131  
Perhaps the most optimistic view of rational basis with bite—and 
rational basis analysis overall—comes from Professor Katie Eyer, who 
viewed the Court’s sporadic application of a more meticulous 
rationality review as the possible signal of a new canon of rational basis 
review.132 Citing a growing variety of cases where the Court applied 
rational basis with bite, Professor Eyer determined that a surprisingly 
“robust history” exists of the Supreme Court “applying more than de 
minimis rational basis review, even outside of the formally heightened 
tiers” if the classification-based government action implicates “group 
or rights-based concerns.”133 In the face of this trend, Professor Eyer 
speculated that the Court may at last be gradually moving away from 
the rigid three-tiered approach of evaluating Equal Protection Clause 
cases and moving toward a more nuanced assessment that places a 
higher burden upon the government when necessary.134 Although 
“rational basis with bite” decisions still are not abundant, leading to the 
conventional wisdom that the application of this test is the exception 
rather than the norm, Professor Eyer stated that “one could argue 
instead that a different account should prevail: one in which the Court’s 
failure to afford a meaningful assessment where group and rights-based 
concerns are implicated is viewed as aberrational.”135  
128 Smith, supra note 22, at 2770. See generally Pettinga, supra note 21.  
129 See Smith, supra note 22, at 2770. See generally Pettinga, supra note 21. 
130 See Smith, supra note 22, at 2770. See generally Pettinga, supra note 21. 
131 Pettinga, supra note 21, at 802–03.  
132 Katie R. Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads and the Canon of Rational Basis Review, 
48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 527, 580–81 (2014). 
133 Id. at 576 (emphasis added). 
134 Id. at 567–80.  
135 Id. at 575.  
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C. Rational Basis with Bite for Veterans
On at least one occasion, the United States Supreme Court has 
applied a form of rational basis with bite to a case directly concerning 
veterans.136 In 1981, an honorably discharged army veteran who had 
served on active duty during the Vietnam War established residence in 
New Mexico.137 Two years later, the veteran applied for a real property 
tax exemption that New Mexico offered to honorably discharged 
“Vietnam Era” veterans.138 The state denied the veteran’s application, 
pointing out that the governing statute allowed for Vietnam Era 
veterans to receive this exemption only if the veteran became a New 
Mexico resident prior to May 8, 1975.139 Upon receiving this denial, 
the veteran and his wife sued the state, arguing that New Mexico’s 
property tax exemption law violated the Equal Protection Clause by 
granting the exemption to certain honorably discharged Vietnam Era 
veterans and refusing to provide the exemptions to others.140  
Applying the traditional rational basis test, New Mexico’s highest 
court ruled in favor of the state.141 According to the New Mexico Court 
of Appeals, the state’s legislature was “entitled to limit the period of 
time within which [veterans] may choose to establish residency” for 
tax exemption purposes.142 The United States Supreme Court, 
however, viewed the statute much differently.143 Though the Court 
began by declaring that the law in question would receive only rational 
basis review, it proceeded to subject the New Mexico government to a 
legal examination that was far more rigorous than anyone expected.144 
Reviewing the decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals, the 
United States Supreme Court noted that New Mexico had put forward 
two rationales for enacting this statute: to demonstrate appreciation 
toward its “own citizens for honorable military service” and to assist 
“veterans who, as [New Mexico] citizens, were dependent on [the State 
136 See Hooper v. Bernalillo Cty. Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985). 




141 Id. at 615–16.  
142 Id. at 616 (alteration in original) (quoting Hooper v. Bernalillo Cty. Assessor, 679 
P.2d 840, 844 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984)).
143 Id. at 623–24.
144 See id. at 617–24; see also Farrell, supra note 103, at 390–92.
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of New Mexico] during a time of upheaval in their lives.”145 To the 
Supreme Court, neither of these reasons bore any rational relation to 
awarding the property tax exemption to only certain honorably 
discharged Vietnam Era veterans.146 “Those who serve in the military 
during wartime inevitably have their lives disrupted,” wrote Chief 
Justice Warren Burger for the Court’s majority, “but it is difficult to 
grasp how New Mexico residents serving in the military suffered more 
than residents of other States who served, so that the latter would not 
deserve the benefits a State bestows for national military service.”147 
A few paragraphs later, the Chief Justice offered similar disdain for the 
law’s segregation of veterans into separate classes.148  
The New Mexico statute creates two tiers of resident Vietnam 
veterans, identifying resident veterans who settled in the State after 
May 8, 1976, as in a sense “second-class citizens.” This 
discrimination on the basis of residence is not supported by any 
identifiable state interest; the statute is not written to benefit only 
those residents who suffered dislocation within the State’s borders by 
reason of military service.149  
Such a painstaking analysis represented a clear departure from the 
typical deference shown to the government in rational basis review—a 
fact that the Court’s three dissenting Justices emphasized.150 “What is 
the justification for placing any limit on the class of eligible veterans?” 
Justice John Paul Stevens rhetorically asked.151 “The most obvious 
answer is that the State’s resources are not infinite. The need to budget 
for the future is itself a valid reason for concluding that a limit should 
be placed on the size of the class of potential beneficiaries.”152 
Although Justice Stevens conceded that New Mexico’s limitations 
regarding this tax exemption were not directly linked to the 
government’s purported goals in enacting the statute, he noted that the 
Court previously had not demanded such exacting standards for laws 
undergoing rational basis review.153 “[S]ince exclusion from the 
favored class merely places the ineligible veteran in the same class as 
the majority of the citizenry, there is no constitutional objection to the 
145 Hooper, 472 U.S. at 619.  
146 Id. at 623–24.  
147 Id. at 621.  
148 Id. at 622–23.  
149 Id. at 623. 
150 Id. at 624–33 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
151 Id. at 627. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 627–28.  
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use of a simple, easily administered standard,” he wrote.154 “The 
statutory requirement of residence before May 8, 1976, is not a perfect 
proxy for identifying those Vietnam veterans seeking admission or 
readmission into New Mexican society, but ‘rational distinctions may 
be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.’”155  
As Justice Stevens correctly noted, the Court’s majority had gone 
above and beyond the conventional rational basis standard of review to 
find that this statute violated the Equal Protection Clause.156 Thus, the 
Court had demonstrated a willingness to apply rational basis with bite 
to a government action that separated veterans into distinct classes, 
granting a benefit to some and denying this benefit to others.157 Now, 
more than thirty years later, this decision remains valid law, 
unblemished by any subsequent United States Supreme Court 
opinions.158  
Chief Justice Burger reinforced this readiness to apply rational basis 
with bite to statutes creating separate classes among veterans in 
Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, a case concerning civil-
service employment preferences that New York State offered to only 
certain veterans.159 New York’s preference scheme offered additional 
points on civil-service examinations for veterans who were residents of 
New York when they entered military service, served on active duty 
during a period of war, and received an honorable discharge.160 While 
the majority of the Justices declared that the residency requirement 
abridged the fundamental right to travel freely among states, thus 
triggering a heightened form of scrutiny, the Chief Justice and Justice 
Byron White declared that this statute could not even survive rational 
basis review.161  
To Chief Justice Burger, the classification-based restrictions 
imposed by this law were unnecessary to meet the state’s alleged 
154 Id. at 627. 
155 Id. (quoting New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)). 
156 Id. at 624–33. 
157 Id. at 615–24. 
158 In fact, a search on the LexisNexis database revealed eleven subsequent decisions 
that apply “positive treatment” to Hooper. Positive Citing Decisions to Hooper, Hooper v. 
Bernalillo Cty. Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 1985 U.S. LEXIS 97 (1985), https://advance.lexis. 
com/api/permalink/0c44ab02-938f-46c1-996e-ee1165843891/?context=1000516 (last 
visited Jan. 13, 2019) (follow “Citing Decisions” hyperlink; then select “Positive” analysis). 
159 476 U.S. 898, 900 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
160 Id.  
161 Id. at 912–13.  
450 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97, 425 
interest in targeting “a very special group of veterans who have both 
knowledge of local affairs and valuable skills learned in the military” 
to become civil servants because “these ‘special attributes’ are 
undeniably possessed by all veterans who are currently residents of 
New York.”162 As with the New Mexico case, it was “difficult to grasp 
how [New York] residents serving in the military suffered more than 
residents of other States who served, so that the latter would not deserve 
the benefits a State bestows for national military service.”163 The 
statute’s categorical distinctions of residency at the time of entering 
military service and serving during a wartime period were therefore 
needless to accomplish the government’s professed goals.164  
Similarly, the Chief Justice objected to the law’s favorable treatment 
for veterans who served on active duty somewhere in the world—not 
necessarily in an area where combat was taking place—during a period 
of war.165 New York State argued that this preference system 
encouraged residents to enlist in the armed forces “during times of 
war.”166 However, Chief Justice Burger pointed out that the 
determination of the dates that constituted “wartime” typically 
involved a retrospective legislative act.167 For instance, legislation 
establishing the commencement date of the Vietnam era was enacted 
three years after hostilities in Southeast Asia began.168 Lawmakers 
later decided that March 29, 1973, represented the ending date of the 
Vietnam era, but then subsequently moved the concluding date of this 
wartime period to May 7, 1975.169 Equivalent legislative confusion 
existed regarding setting the precise dates of the “Korean Conflict.”170 
Based on this pattern of determining the exact dates of wartime after 
the war had started (and, at times, changing the dates after the war had 
ended), Chief Justice Burger concluded that “[i]n many cases a New 
York resident entering military service will have no idea whether he or 
she will be entitled to the preference following a successful tour of duty 
and honorable discharge.”171 Without clear and consistent parameters 
regarding the beginning and ending dates of wartime service, the 
162 Id. at 915. 
163 Id. at 914.  
164 Id. at 912–16. 
165 Id. at 913–14. 
166 Id. at 913.  
167 Id. at 913–14. 
168 Id. at 913.  
169 Id.  
170 Id. at 913–14. 
171 Id. at 913.  
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government could not rationally connect this preference-based 
program with statewide wartime recruiting efforts.172  
In dissent, Justice O’Connor and Justice Stevens insisted that their 
colleagues in the Court’s majority had gone out of their way to 
invalidate this statute as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.173 
Justice Stevens asked, 
If a State should grant a special bonus to fighter pilots who are 
residents at the time of enlistment, to those who fought in the Battle 
of Midway, or perhaps just to the few who received the 
Congressional Medal of Honor—would it violate the Equal 
Protection Clause to deny bonuses to comparable veterans who 
moved into the State after the end of the war? I think not, even though 
the reasoning in the opinions supporting the judgment would apply 
to each of those cases as well as it does to [the New Mexico property 
tax exemption decision] and to this case.174  
The implications of the dissenters’ statements were blunt: the Court had 
engaged in far deeper scrutiny than what was legally necessary.175 
Rational links existed between the state’s aims and the classifications 
established within the civil-service preference law, but the Court’s 
majority had rejected the conventionally deferential form of rational 
basis review that would have recognized these connections and upheld 
the statute.176  
Thus, while the sample size of such decisions is small, the door 
remains undoubtedly ajar for the United States Supreme Court (and 
other courts) to apply rational basis with bite to Equal Protection Clause 
cases involving classifications of veterans.177 Between the precedents 
established by these veterans-specific opinions and the trends identified 
within the broader array of cases in which the Supreme Court has used 
rational basis with bite, the chance of a state action that discriminates 
among various classes of veterans running afoul of the Equal Protection 
Clause is greater than one might initially expect.178 Against this 
backdrop, we now examine the potential Equal Protection Clause 
implications of the categorizations that commonly occur in the context 
of Veterans Treatment Courts, evaluating whether these classification-
172 Id. at 913–14.  
173 See id. at 916–25 (Stevens, J., and O’Connor, J., dissenting).  
174 Id. at 918 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
175 See id. at 918, 920–25 (Stevens, J., and O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
176 See supra note 173.  
177 See supra notes 143–49, 158–72, and accompanying text. 
178 See id.  
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based distinctions for justice-involved veterans may fail to satisfy 
rational basis review.  
IV 
POTENTIAL EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATIONS IN VETERANS 
TREATMENT COURTS 
As noted earlier, the most obvious classification scheme that 
Veterans Treatment Courts employ—separating veterans from 
nonveterans within the criminal justice system—seems to pass the 
rational basis test with ease.179 As Veterans Treatment Courts engage 
in the process of categorically accepting certain justice-involved 
veterans and rejecting others, however, Equal Protection Clause 
violations could emerge, particularly if a court were to review the 
classification-based distinctions using rational basis with bite.180 This 
section explores some of the more commonplace classification lines 
that Veterans Treatment Courts draw and evaluates their potential to 
withstand an Equal Protection Clause–based attack. 
A. Combat Veterans vs. Noncombat Veterans
Some Veterans Treatment Courts accept only veterans who can 
prove that they served on active duty in a combat theater.181 Typically, 
the rationale for such a distinction is simple: the belief that combat 
veterans experience more difficult conditions of service than 
noncombat veterans and therefore encounter greater physical and 
mental barriers when readjusting from military life to civilian life.182 
For example, given the enhanced daily strain that combat imposes upon 
a service member’s life, one could argue that combat veterans are more 
likely to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) than 
noncombat veterans.183 Considering the physical challenges of combat 
179 Merriam, supra note 24.  
180 See supra Part III.  
181 See, e.g., Robert T. Russell, Veterans Treatment Courts, in ATTORNEY’S GUIDE TO 
DEFENDING VETERANS IN CRIMINAL COURT 515, 522 (Brockton D. Hunter & Ryan C. Else 
eds., 2014).  
182 Jeffrey Lewis Wieand, Jr., Note, Continuing Combat at Home: How Judges and 
Attorneys Can Improve Their Handling of Combat Veterans with PTSD in Criminal Courts, 
19 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 227, 228–35, 256–61 (2012); McMichael, supra 
note 49. 
183 See McMichael, supra note 49 (“I think that if they’ve been damaged as a result of 
their service . . . in a combat zone, that ethically and morally we need to respond by offering 
them special services to restore them to who they were.”); Lisa K. Richardson, B. 
Christopher Frueh & Ronald Acierno, Prevalence Estimates of Combat-Related PTSD: A 
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service, one could also assert that combat veterans are more likely to 
sustain a traumatic brain injury (TBI).184 The list of these beliefs is 
long, but each of these arguments ultimately reaches the same 
conclusion: combat veterans represent a special segment of the overall 
veteran population who deserve particularly careful attention and care 
from the state.185  
Certainly, no one can reasonably deny that combat service by its 
very nature is strenuous and perilous.186 No one can reasonably argue 
about whether a combat veteran faces the constant potential of severe 
injury or death simply by virtue of spending every day inside a war 
zone.187 Plenty of highly credible studies demonstrate the physical and 
mental cost of combat on veterans’ lives, leaving no doubt that veterans 
who have served in combat merit attention and care from the 
government.188  
It is difficult, however, to discern a rational reason why a noncombat 
veteran should never be eligible for entry into a Veterans Treatment 
Court. As Chief Justice Burger pointed out when describing Equal 
Protection Clause violations that required “wartime” service within the 
New York State civil service preference, a military member does not 
know whether he or she will serve in combat at the time of 
enlistment.189 On the contrary, a service member takes the oath to 
protect and defend the Constitution of the United States against all 
enemies, foreign and domestic, without knowing what his or her future 
entails.190 Even during a period when the United States is at war, the 
military may choose not to send a particular service member into a 
Critical Review, 44 AUSTL. N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 1, 4–12 (2010), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih. 
gov/pmc/articles/PMC2891773/.  
184 Charles W. Hoge et al., Mild Traumatic Brain Injury in U.S. Soldiers Returning from 
Iraq, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 453, 453–63 (2008).  
185 See, e.g., McMichael, supra note 49. 
186 Carl A. Castro, Sara Kintzle & Anthony M. Hassan, The Combat Veteran Paradox: 
Paradoxes and Dilemmas Encountered with Reintegrating Combat Veterans and the 
Agencies That Support Them, 21 TRAUMATOLOGY 299, 299–301 (2015).  
187 See id.  
188 See id.  
189 Att’y Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 913–14 (1986) (Burger, C.J., 
concurring). 
190 Rich Galen, Enemies Foreign and Domestic, CNS NEWS (May 6, 2013, 4:54 AM), 
https://www.cnsnews.com/blog/rich-galen/enemies-foreign-and-domestic (“Every . . . 
commissioned officer (civilian and military) in federal service as well as every enlisted 
service member takes an oath that requires they promise to ‘support and defend the 
Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic . . . .’”).  
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combat theater—even if the service member asks for a combat 
assignment.191 A military member is wholly subject to the orders of his 
or her superior officers, and these decisions from a service member’s 
commanders—decisions that are presumably made for the good of the 
military overall—may keep that service member from ever setting foot 
within the perimeter of a combat zone.192  
Nevertheless, a lack of combat service does not inherently signify 
that a particular veteran enjoyed an easy military career.193 A service 
member stationed at Dover Air Force Base, tasked with unloading the 
flag-covered caskets of his or her deceased comrades from planes and 
wheeling them to the hanger where the grieving family members are 
waiting for their loved one’s coffin to arrive, could be a prime candidate 
for suffering from PTSD based on repeated traumatic experiences.194 
A military member conducting unmanned drone strikes on targets in 
Afghanistan may be physically sitting at a base in the Nevada desert 
but, knowing that any wrong move at any time could potentially kill or 
maim an innocent bystander, he or she may be sustaining as much 
cumulative stress as a service member stationed in Afghanistan.195 A 
mission such as Operation Unified Response, the humanitarian effort 
in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake that devastated Haiti, involved 
no entry into an officially designated combat theater, but the military 
members involved in the operation performed plenty of jobs that 
191 See, e.g., Nathan Eckman, What It Means to Be a Veteran Without the Experience of 
War, TASK & PURPOSE (Aug. 12, 2016, 5:15 AM), https://taskandpurpose.com/means-
veteran-without-experience-war/.  
192 See, e.g., id. (“But the idea that only warriors or those directly affected by war in 
obvious ways can speak to war’s effects with authority isn’t true. In many respects the 
difference between those who served like I did was a matter of luck. We signed the same 
contract, shipped off to the same training grounds and entered similar units.”).  
193 See supra notes 190–93 and accompanying text. 
194 Rachel Martin, At Dover Air Force Base, Bringing Home the Fallen with Grief and 
Joy, NPR (May 24, 2015), https://www.npr.org/2015/05/24/408531645/at-dover-air-force-
base-bringing-home-the-fallen-with-grief-and-joy. See Robert J. Ursano et al., Post-
traumatic Stress Disorder and Identification in Disaster Workers, 156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
353, 354 (1999); Mark Thompson, PTSD Also Happens Far from the Front, TIME (Mar. 
30, 2011), http://nation.time.com/2011/03/30/ptsd-also-happens-far-from-the-front/.  
195 Pratap Chatterjee, A Chilling New Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: Why Drone 
Pilots Are Quitting in Record Numbers, SALON (Mar. 6, 2015, 12:30 AM), 
https://www.salon.com/2015/03/06/a_chilling_new_post_traumatic_stress_disorder_why_
drone_pilots_are_quitting_in_record_numbers_partner/; James Dao, Drone Pilots Are 
Found to Get Stress Disorders Much as Those in Combat Do, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/23/us/drone-pilots-found-to-get-stress-disorders-much-
as-those-in-combat-do.html; Sarah McCammon, The Warfare May Be Remote but the 
Trauma Is Real, NPR (Apr. 24, 2017, 2:40 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/04/24/ 
525413427/for-drone-pilots-warfare-may-be-remote-but-the-trauma-is-real.  
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involved significant physical risk and exposure to the type of extensive 
devastation that could leave a veteran struggling to readjust to civilian 
life after returning home.196 A noncombat service member who is 
physically assaulted by a fellow noncombat service member could face 
as many difficulties as a combat military member in reacclimating to a 
“normal” life after the assault occurs.197  
Thus, it is erroneous to assume that combat veterans are the only 
class of veterans who deserve a heightened level of attention and 
care.198 As the examples listed in the preceding paragraph illustrate, 
plenty of noncombat veterans have experienced traumas that are every 
bit as severe—and, at times, even more severe—than the traumas that 
combat veterans have sustained.199 Every veteran’s experience in the 
military is unique.200 To paint all combat veterans and all noncombat 
veterans with such a broadly homogenizing brush is therefore a 
contradictory act.201  
This segregation favoring combat veterans and excluding 
noncombat veterans might still satisfy the traditional rational basis test, 
given the extreme deference that this test gives to the government.202 
A more thorough inquiry under “rational basis with bite,” however, 
could leave the state vulnerable to defeat by the Equal Protection 
Clause.203 As demonstrated above, plenty of fault lines run through the 
generalization that combat veterans experience greater hardships and 
stresses during their military service and thus are the only class of 
196 Bennett Gore, Can I Have PTSD if I Was Never in Combat?, BLUESTEIN 
ATTORNEYS: BLOG (Nov. 3, 2016, 7:52 AM), http://info.bluesteinattorneys.com/can-i-
have-ptsd-if-i-was-never-in-combat.  
197 See, e.g., Jon Corra, 4 Examples of Non-Combat PTSD, VETERANS DISABILITY 
BLOG (Oct. 9, 2014), https://www.veterandisabilityblog.com/blog/4-examples-of-non-
combat-ptsd/; Brian Adam Jones, The Military’s Problem with Sexual Assault Is Not a Data 
Problem, TASK & PURPOSE (Dec. 9, 2014, 4:20 PM), https://taskandpurpose.com/militarys-
problem-sexual-assault-not-data-problem/; Non-Combat Women Military Veterans 
Describe How They Got PTSD, USMC LIFE (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.usmclife.com/ 
2017/08/non-combat-women-military-veterans-describe-got-ptsd/.  
198 See supra notes 190–97 and accompanying text.  
199 Supra notes 190–93 and accompanying text.  
200 Eckman, supra note 191.  
201 See id.; see also Daniel M. Gade, A Better Way to Help Veterans, NAT’L AFF. (2013), 
https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/a-better-way-to-help-veterans; 
Sebastian Junger, How PTSD Became a Problem Far Beyond the Battlefield, VANITY FAIR 
(June 2015), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2015/05/ptsd-war-home-sebastian-junger.  
202 See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text. 
203 See supra Part III.  
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veterans worthy to receive access to Veterans Treatment Courts.204 
Consequently, the government will have a difficult time articulating a 
rational basis for categorically excluding all noncombat veterans from 
the services that Veterans Treatment Courts provide, given that these 
courts are designed to provide a sustainable mechanism to assist 
veterans in their complete return to civilian life.205  
Already, one Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court has 
employed rational basis with bite when evaluating a government 
program that segregated “peacetime veterans” from veterans who 
served during a wartime period.206 One could easily imagine other 
justices and judges following Chief Justice Burger’s lead, especially as 
researchers devote an increasing level of long-overdue attention to the 
challenges that noncombat veterans confront.207 In addition, 
discrimination against noncombat veterans is one of the factors that has 
historically increased the probability of the Supreme Court employing 
some form of rational basis with bite.208 For example, this 
classification-based distinction is one of the factors that Holoszyc-
Pimentel identified as triggering a more rigorous form of rational basis 
review.209 Noncombat status is a type of immutable characteristic, as a 
service member is unable to control the decisions of his or her 
commanding officers.210 Plenty of military members who want to serve 
in combat are never granted a combat assignment.211 Given the overall 
lack of authority that service members possess in the decision of where 
they are stationed, discriminating against noncombat veterans in the 
context of access to Veterans Treatment Courts “suggests the kind of 
‘class or caste’ treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed 
to abolish.”212 The fundamental nature of the right that is abridged by 
this discrimination—an absolute denial of access to a form of justice 
204 See supra notes 190–97 and accompanying text. 
205 See supra Part I.  
206 Att’y Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 913–14 (1986) (Burger, C.J., 
concurring). 
207 See supra notes 190–200 and accompanying text. 
208 See supra Part III; infra notes 214–17 and accompanying text.  
209 Holoszyc-Pimentel, supra note 96, at 2078–99, 2102.  
210 Eckman, supra note 191.  
211 Id.  
212 Holoszyc-Pimentel, supra note 96, at 2102 (quoting Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 
n.14 (1982)).
2019] Rational Justice: Equal Protection Problems Amid Veterans 457 
Treatment Court Eligibility Categorizations
that combat veterans are able to enjoy—further enhances the likelihood 
of a court applying rational basis with bite in these circumstances.213  
Therefore, a reasonable probability exists that a court would employ 
rational basis with bite when evaluating an Equal Protection Clause–
based challenge to this classification-based scheme. If a court engaged 
in a meaningful analysis of this policy, the court could plausibly make 
a determination that a ban on noncombat veterans entering Veterans 
Treatment Courts is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 
A Veterans Treatment Court that refuses to admit noncombat veterans 
thus risks having this divisive classification overturned on Equal 
Protection Clause grounds.  
B. Honorable Discharges vs. Other Characters of Discharge
Many Veterans Treatment Courts accept only veterans who have 
received an honorable discharge from the Armed Forces.214 The United 
States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) excludes former military 
members possessing lower characters of discharge from many of their 
benefits, programs, and services.215 As a result, Veterans Treatment 
Courts often determine that they cannot accept the cases of these 
individuals, as it will be harder to link them with medical care and other 
forms of assistance.216 Furthermore, a state could also argue that given 
the limited resources available to operate a Veterans Treatment Court, 
certain exclusionary lines must be drawn.217 Under this rationale, the 
government could assert that it makes sense to focus only on assisting 
the women and men who served honorably in the military, rather than 
213 See id.; see also supra Part I (describing the potential benefits of a justice-involved 
veteran entering Veterans Treatment Court rather than navigating the traditional criminal 
court process).  
214 Baldwin, supra note 13, at 742. 
215 See 38 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “veteran” as an individual who was discharged 
from active duty military service under conditions “other than dishonorable”). Therefore, 
individuals whose character of discharge does not match this definition are ineligible to 
receive disability compensation, nonservice-connected pension, education benefits under 
the G.I. Bill, vocational rehabilitation services, and other benefits and programs 
administered by the United States Department of Veterans Affairs.  
216 Martin Kuz, VA Policy Hinders Veterans Courts in Aiding Thousands of Vets with 
“Bad Paper,” SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (Sept. 1, 2017), https://www.expressnews. 
com/news/local/article/VA-policy-hinders-veterans-courts-in-aiding-12167681.php 
(updated Sept. 14, 2017, 10:59 AM).  
217 See Moga, supra note 28 (“See, many [Veterans Treatment Courts] exclude you if 
you have a less than honorable discharge and you’re not entitled to VA treatment. There’s 
always reasons to exclude people, and that’s not for me to say; that’s up to every court.”).  
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offering an alternative to incarceration to someone who received a 
lower form of discharge.218 The state could even allege that a veteran 
who previously caused some form of trouble while serving in the 
military, thus leading to the less-than-honorable discharge, is more 
likely to commit another criminal offense. In the state’s view, this 
propensity to commit crime removes the need for the judicial system to 
grant that individual a chance to complete a Veterans Treatment Court 
program in lieu of incarceration.219  
Both of these rationales for accepting only honorably discharged 
veterans are flimsy.220 Plenty of Veterans Treatment Courts across the 
nation accept veterans with less-than-honorable characters of 
discharge.221 None of these courts were bankrupted by accepting 
veterans for whom the VA will not provide certain benefits and 
services.222 Importantly, the VA has recently relaxed its historic 
rigidity regarding discharge classification and has begun offering some 
benefits, programs, and services to veterans who hold lower characters 
of discharge.223 Beginning in July 2018, veterans with characters of 
service other than honorable—the most severe form of administrative 
discharge from the armed forces—were able to receive mental health 
care at all VA medical facilities for a minimum of ninety days.224 If the 
VA determines that the veteran’s mental health condition was caused 
or exacerbated by his or her active duty military service, then the VA 
may continue the treatment beyond the ninety-day window.225 
Regarding financial compensation for veterans who were injured while 
serving in the military or who currently receive an extremely low 
income, the VA holds the discretion to grant financial benefits to an 
218 Kuz, supra note 216.  
219 Baldwin, supra note 13, at 730.  
220 See infra notes 224–51 and accompanying text.  
221 Baldwin, supra note 13, at 742 (showing that approximately half the nation’s 
Veterans Treatment Courts do not automatically bar justice-involved veterans with a 
character of service that is lower than honorable).  
222 Indeed, some of the leaders of these courts demonstrate an impressive level of 
stability. See, e.g., Russell, supra note 181; Moga, supra note 28; Veterans Treatment Courts 
Are a “Game Changer” and Easy to Implement, Judges Say, A.B.A. (Aug. 15, 2017), 
https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2017/08/veterans_ 
treatmentc.html.  
223 See supra notes 219–22 and accompanying text. 
224 Jonathan Kaupanger, Veterans with Other-than-Honorable Discharge Now Able 
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individual with a lower character of discharge, as long as the VA 
determines that the specific circumstances leading to that veteran’s 
discharge were “other than dishonorable.”226 If the VA determines that 
such a veteran suffers from disabilities that are connected to that 
veteran’s military service, the veteran will receive free medical care 
from the VA for those medical conditions.227 Veterans Service Officers 
on the court’s treatment team can assist veterans in navigating these 
systems to obtain all the VA benefits, programs, and services that they 
are eligible to receive.228  
Additionally, community providers frequently can fill any gaps of 
treatment and care that a veteran with a less-than-honorable discharge 
cannot receive from the VA.229 Successful Veterans Treatment Courts 
cultivate strong relationships with community-based organizations that 
can assist justice-involved veterans in various areas.230 A 
determination that a veteran is ineligible for any VA services does not 
inherently make that veteran ineligible from other service providers.231 
As a result, the government cannot justify an absolute ban on accepting 
veterans with discharges that are less than honorable into a Veterans 
Treatment Court by claiming that none of these veterans have any 
226 See 38 U.S.C. § 101(2) (2012); 38 C.F.R. § 3.12 (2012). The phrasing of these 
provisions allows a veteran with a character of discharge that is lower than honorable to still 
remain eligible for compensatory benefits from the VA. For instance, a veteran with a 
general discharge under honorable conditions is still eligible for disability compensation 
benefits or pension benefits from the VA, even though that veteran’s character of discharge 
is lower than an honorable discharge. A veteran with a discharge other than honorable may 
remain eligible for these financial benefits, too, as long as the VA’s adjudicators find that 
the reasons for the veteran’s discharge were not dishonorable in nature. 
227 Alex Horton, Busting Myths About VA Health Care Eligibility, VANTAGE POINT: 
OFFICIAL BLOG U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF. (Nov. 18, 2010, 4:56 PM), 
https://www.blogs.va.gov/VAntage/586/busting-myths-about-va-health-care/. 
228 See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text (discussing the Veterans Treatment 
Court’s role as a “one-stop shop” for veterans to work with subject-matter experts in 
obtaining the benefits that they earned by virtue of their military service).  
229 Moga, supra note 28. 
230 Notably, one of the ten key components of Veterans Treatment Courts published by 
the National Clearinghouse for Veterans Treatment Courts at the National Association of 
Drug Court Professionals calls on Veterans Treatment Courts to establish “partnerships 
among Veterans Treatment Court, Veterans Administration, public agencies, and 
community-based organizations [which] generates local support and enhances Veteran 
Treatment Court effectiveness.” The Ten Key Components of Veterans Treatment Courts, 
NAT’L DRUG CT. RESOURCE CTR. (2012), https://ndcrc.org/resource/10-key-components-
for-veterans-treatment-courts/. This underscores the fact that a successful Veterans 
Treatment Court should never rely upon the VA alone when developing a network of 
services to assist justice-involved veterans. See id.  
231 Moga, supra note 28. 
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reasonable hope of receiving the medical treatment and other forms of 
care that they need.232  
Similarly, the government would have a difficult time justifying an 
assertion that only veterans with honorable discharges deserve the 
second chance that Veterans Treatment Courts provide.233 Abundant 
evidence demonstrates that not all less-than-honorable discharges are 
created equal.234 Some veterans carry a lower character of discharge 
solely because they are gay or lesbian, a sexual orientation that the 
Department of Defense deemed to be “incompatible with military 
service” for many years.235 Others received a less-than-honorable 
discharge due to an act of retaliation by their commanding officer(s).236 
Still others were discharged with a less-than-honorable 
characterization after the military caught them using illegal drugs or 
drinking in excess—steps that these service members were taking 
solely to alleviate severe stresses that they were encountering as a result 
of their military service.237 On some occasions, military recruiters 
enlist men and women with medical conditions that threaten their 
ability to succeed in the Armed Forces, only to result in that service 
member receiving a less-than-honorable discharge when that 
preexisting condition manifests in a negative way during military 
service.238 Another all-too-common set of circumstances involves 
232 Id.  
233 See infra notes 235–41 and accompanying text.  
234 See, e.g., Marcy L. Karin, “Other than Honorable” Discrimination, 67 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 135, 158–73 (2016).
235 Brian Turner, The End of “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” Edited by J. Ford Huffman and
Tammy S. Schultz, WASH. POST (Aug. 17, 2002), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
opiniion/the-end-of-dont-ask-dont-tell-edited-by-j-ford-huffman-and-tammy-s-schultz/ 
2012/08/17/6e9adc08-dbd5-11e1-9974-5c975ae4810f_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_ 
term=.6c104d1f3a6f; see Jennifer McDermott, Few Veterans Expelled Under “Don’t Ask” 
Policy Seek Remedy, MILITARY TIMES (June 24, 2016), https://www.militarytimes.com/ 
veterans/2016/06/24/few-vets-expelled-under-don-t-ask-seek-remedy/.  
236 See, e.g., Booted: Lack of Recourse for Wrongfully Discharged U.S. Military Rape 
Survivors, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 19, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/ 
05/19/booted/lack-recourse-wrongfully-discharged-us-military-rape-survivors. 
237 Christine Stuart, PTSD Vets Say Navy Dropped Ball on Boards Meant to Help Them, 
COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.courthousenews.com/ptsd-vets-
say-navy-dropped-ball-on-boards-meant-to-help-them/; see Karin, supra note 234, at 165–
66.  
238 See Troop Discharges High for “Pre-Existing” Psychiatric Disorders, FOX NEWS 
(Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/12/16/troop-discharges-high-pre-
existing-psychiatric-disorders.html (last updated Dec. 24, 2015). The author of this Article 
has personally represented veterans in cases where recruiters urged individuals to conceal 
the existence of diagnosed mental health conditions in order to gain entry into a branch of 
the Armed Forces.  
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veterans who received a discharge that was less than honorable because 
of medical conditions caused or exacerbated by that veteran’s military 
service.239 Between 2011 and 2015 alone, more than 57,000 service 
members suffering from PTSD or from a traumatic brain injury 
received less-than-honorable discharges when the symptoms of these 
conditions caused them to act in a manner deemed insubordinate or 
otherwise detrimental to the good of the military.240  
In such circumstances, it makes little sense to punish the veteran by 
denying him or her access to a Veterans Treatment Court.241 Doing so 
is tantamount to penalizing the affected service member for his or her 
sexual orientation, or perpetuating the retaliatory act committed by the 
commanding officer, or preventing the veteran from obtaining 
assistance because of the nature of his or her disability—even if that 
disability were caused or worsened by military service itself.242 Such a 
policy of discrimination does not appear to advance any legitimate state 
interest.243  
Furthermore, a uniform ban on accepting veterans with less-than-
honorable discharges undermines the government’s original interest in 
establishing Veterans Treatment Courts.244 These courts exist because 
239 Dan Lamothe, Thousands of U.S. Troops Suffering from Trauma Were Separated 




240 Dave Philipps, Wounded Troops Discharged for Misconduct Often Had PTSD or 
T.B.I., N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/16/us/military-
misconduct-ptsd.html. 
241 Merriam, supra note 24, at 740–43. 
242 Cf. Karin, supra note 234 (providing a similarly compelling argument for permitting 
veterans with other-than-honorable discharges to receive the same legal protections 
regarding their rights to reemployment in their civilian jobs as honorable discharged 
veterans).  
243 See Booted, supra note 236 (“Sexual assault survivors who seek a record change 
through the service Boards face various hurdles that severely limit their due process 
rights. . . . Though service members with bad discharges have their benefits and reputations 
at stake, their cases are afforded very limited review.”); Dave Philipps, Pattern of 
Misconduct: Psychological Screenings Prompt Call for More Reforms, GAZETTE (Oct. 7, 
2013), https://cdn.csgazette.biz/soldiers/day4.html (“Tossing people out for minor 
infractions without care for the very issues that might have caused them to act up? It’s really 
disturbing.”).  
244 Merriam, supra note 24, at 740 (“Beneath the pronouncements by VTC [Veterans 
Treatment Court] creators and proponents that VTCs should be open only for those who 
served honorably lies the reality that many veterans with other than honorable conditions 
characterizations need the assistance offered by VTCs as much as veterans with honorable 
characterizations who find themselves accused of criminal misconduct. Indeed, such 
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the government recognized the unique hardships that an individual can 
encounter during military service and throughout the transition back to 
civilian life.245 These challenges are not eradicated simply because a 
person’s discharge paperwork does not contain the word 
“honorable.”246 On the contrary, a veteran who receives such a 
discharge often faces even greater obstacles in returning to civilian life 
due to legal barriers and widespread social stigmatization associated 
with a “bad paper” separation.247 If the government legitimately wishes 
to use Veterans Treatment Courts as a vehicle for rehabilitating justice-
involved veterans so they can live stable and productive lives as 
civilians, then the government should not automatically reject any 
veteran with a less-than-honorable discharge.248  
Again, the government’s insubstantial reasons for banning all 
veterans with a less-than-honorable discharge from Veterans 
Treatment Courts still might prevail under the deferential, traditional 
rational basis test.249 However, a government action that discriminates 
against all veterans with less-than-honorable discharges may be 
another area in which a court decides to apply rational basis with 
bite.250 Gerald Kerska determined that the United States Supreme 
Court was more likely to use some form of rational basis with bite when 
the government policy under review involved “the targeting of a 
distinct and disfavored social group.”251 Here, the decision to ban all 
veterans with less-than-honorable discharges targets a particular group 
of individuals who are well-known to be socially stigmatized.252 Eyer 
found that the Court uses rational basis with bite most frequently in 
cases that blatantly implicate “group or rights-based concerns.”253 This 
rationale can apply to a situation where all veterans with less-than-
honorable discharges are banned without any further review from a 
veterans may need it more, because their spiral of decline from injury to substance abuse to 
minor offenses to significant crime may be further along.”).  
245 See supra Part I.  
246 Moga, supra note 28.  
247 Karin, supra note 234; Booted, supra note 236; McDermott, supra note 235; Philipps, 
supra note 243. 
248 See supra notes 220–47 and accompanying text.  
249 See supra Part II. 
250 See supra Part III. 
251 Kerska, supra note 127, at 1720.  
252 Karin, supra note 234; Booted, supra note 236; Lamothe, supra note 239; 
McDermott, supra note 235; Philipps, supra note 243. 
253 Eyer, supra note 132, at 576. 
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Veterans Treatment Court.254 Holoszyc-Pimentel’s survey pointed out 
that the Court tends to employ rational basis with bite to categorical 
distinctions based largely upon immutable characteristics.255 As 
demonstrated above, ample evidence shows that immutable 
characteristics can cause a veteran’s less-than-honorable discharge, 
including that individual’s sexual orientation and the symptoms of that 
veteran’s disabilities.256  
This Article does not argue that Veterans Treatment Courts should 
simply ignore a justice-involved veteran’s military record when 
deciding whether to accept that individual into the court’s treatment 
program. Indeed, plenty of veterans receive less-than-honorable 
discharges for reasons that could rationally demonstrate that they are 
not an appropriate fit for a Veterans Treatment Court, such as a lengthy 
history of criminal offenses committed while in military service. 
However, Veterans Treatment Courts should make such determinations 
on a case-by-case basis, assessing the true reasons why the veteran 
received a lower character of discharge. If a court were to thoroughly 
examine the government’s reasons for rejecting all such veterans from 
a Veterans Treatment Court, it could reasonably determine that this 
absolute ban is not rationally related to any legitimate state interest and 
therefore find that this classification-based exclusion violates the Equal 
Protection Clause.  
C. Nexus Requirements
Some Veterans Treatment Courts require a justice-involved veteran 
to demonstrate a specific link between military service and the charged 
offense before the court will even consider admitting that veteran into 
the court’s treatment program.257 At first glance, the reason for this 
prerequisite seems quite sensible: an individual wishing to use a 
Veterans Treatment Court’s special benefits must prove that some 
254 Id. 
255 Holoszyc-Pimentel, supra note 96, at 2078–99, 2102.  
256 See supra notes 233–40 and accompanying text.  
257 BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, VETERANS TREATMENT COURTS: 2015 SURVEY 
RESULTS 14 (2015), https://www.american.edu/spa/jpo/initiatives/drug-court/upload/ 
Veterans-Treatment-Courts-2015-Survey-Results.pdf (stating that approximately one-fifth 
of the Veterans Treatment Courts responding to the survey required a nexus between the 
justice-involved veteran’s charged offense(s) and his or her military experiences); Eleanor 
C. Sinnott, Boston Veterans Treatment Court: A Team Dynamic, BOS. B.J. (Oct. 25, 2016),
https://bostonbarjournal.com/2016/10/25/boston-veterans-treatment-court-a-team-
dynamic/; see Cartwright, supra note 3, at 308; Jones, supra note 15, at 318.
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experience unique to the military led to that individual committing a 
crime.258 Proponents of such mandates argue that without this causal 
nexus requirement, no rational reasons exist for offering justice-
involved veterans any services that are not also provided to other 
similarly situated criminal defendants.259  
Causal nexus requirements for veterans run into trouble when 
exploring the logistics of determining that such a causal link exists.260 
In theory, the court could demand that the veteran prove that he or she 
has a disability that the VA declared to be caused or aggravated by 
military service, and the court could further insist that the veteran link 
this service-connected disability to the charged offense(s).261 In reality, 
though, such a method is not plausible given the lengthy waiting 
periods that many veterans endure to receive a disability rating from 
the VA and the high rate of inaccurate initial decisions that the VA 
renders in service-connected disability compensation claims.262 
Veterans who could benefit greatly from a Veterans Treatment Court’s 
assistance should not face denial of its services solely because another 
government agency has yet to issue an accurate assessment of the links 
between the veteran’s wounds and his or her service in the armed 
forces.263  
Taking off the table exclusive reliance upon the VA’s determination 
of service-connected disabilities, the picture of how to screen for a 
258 Jones, supra note 15, at 317–18 (warning that failing to establish a causal nexus 
requirement could turn justice-involved veterans into an unwarranted “special legal class” 
of defendants in criminal proceedings).  
259 Id. at 318 (discussing multiple state-level American Civil Liberties Union reports 
about Veterans Treatment Court eligibility that raised this same concern); see also 
Cartwright, supra note 3, at 316 (“[T]he ideal program would allow diversion for a broader 
range of crimes, but require a tighter nexus between the criminal behavior and the 
defendant’s combat experience.”).  
260 See infra notes 258–64 and accompanying text. 
261 Thankfully, this does not appear to be the route that most Veterans Treatment Courts 
are taking when establishing causal nexus requirements for justice-involved veterans. 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 257 (describing several forms of proof other 
than a VA award letter that most Veterans Treatment Courts will accept as evidence of a 
nexus between military service and the charged offense(s)).  
262 See, e.g., Leo Shane III, Once a Fixed Issue, the VA Disability Claims Backlog Is on 
the Rise Again, MILITARY TIMES (Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.militarytimes.com/ 
news/pentagon-congress/2017/03/24/once-a-fixed-issue-the-va-disability-claims-backlog-
is-on-the-rise-again/. 
263 See Alan Zarembo, VA Is Buried in a Backlog of Never-Ending Veterans Disability 
Appeals, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-veterans-
appeals-backlog-20151123-story.html (demonstrating the multifaceted problems that the 
VA’s backlog of unresolved disability compensation claims is already causing for veterans 
across the nation).  
2019] Rational Justice: Equal Protection Problems Amid Veterans 465 
Treatment Court Eligibility Categorizations
nexus between military service and the charged offense(s) becomes 
even murkier.264 Courts could conceivably open their evidentiary doors 
to any forms of medical proof linking the veteran’s criminal action with 
a disability caused or worsened by that veteran’s military 
experiences.265 Yet with recent studies demonstrating that private-
sector medical care providers commonly lack any familiarity with 
military culture and service-connected health conditions, this method 
ultimately suffers from the same flaws as relying entirely upon the VA 
for service-connection determinations.266 Given the high likelihood of 
a medical professional with little-to-no military cultural competency 
providing an inaccurate assessment regarding a nexus between a 
veteran’s disability and that veteran’s military service, a Veterans 
Treatment Court cannot rationally rely upon such an assessment as a 
reason to automatically bar certain justice-involved veterans from its 
courtrooms.267  
As with the other classification-based schemes discussed in this 
section, a court applying the traditional, deferential rational basis test 
will probably leave these causal nexus requirements unscathed.268 
Plenty of case law assures the government that a method of state-
imposed classification does not need to fit neatly—or, at times, even 
accurately—with the government’s purpose for establishing the 
discriminatory standard.269 If a court engaged in the more rigorous 
scrutiny of rational basis with bite, however, the above examples show 
that a court could sensibly find that a Veterans Treatment Court’s 
causal nexus requirement is not rationally related to the state’s interest 
of finding only “worthy” candidates for the court’s treatment 
program.270  
264 See infra notes 266–67 and accompanying text. 
265 BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 257 (showing the disparate forms of 
proof that various Veterans Treatment Courts deem acceptable for proving a nexus between 
the charged offense and military service).  
266 See, e.g., TERRI TANIELIAN ET AL., READY OR NOT? ASSESSING THE CAPACITY OF 
NEW YORK STATE HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS TO MEET THE NEEDS OF VETERANS (2018), 
https://nyshealthfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/RAND-Ready-or-Not-
Veterans-Care-March-2018.pdf. 
267 See id. at 46 (“[W]e discovered that most [healthcare providers] also know little about 
the military or veterans, are not routinely screening for conditions common among veterans, 
and are unfamiliar with VA and initiatives to expand access to community-based care for 
VA-enrolled veterans.”).  
268 Supra Part II.  
269 See supra notes 79–83, 96–100, and accompanying text. 
270 Supra Part III.  
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Regarding the probability of a court using rational basis with bite, 
one can return again to the seemingly enhanced likelihood of courts 
applying this heightened scrutiny when the classification is based on 
something entirely beyond the adversely affected group’s control.271 A 
child seeking to attend a public school is powerless to control the 
citizenship of his or her parents.272 A person with disabilities cannot 
stop municipal leaders from amending the city’s housing code.273 By 
the same token, a veteran seeking a medical opinion or a determination 
from the VA holds no control whatsoever over the doctor’s competency 
in stating that a nexus exists between that veteran’s disability and that 
veteran’s military service.274 No veteran possesses power over a 
medical professional’s awareness of the most current research about 
the connections between certain medical conditions and certain 
military experiences.275 Likewise, no veteran can control the final 
determination of a VA ratings team employee—an individual who 
likely possesses no medical training—regarding whether that veteran’s 
disabilities were caused or exacerbated by his or her military service.276 
Therefore, it logically follows that a veteran should not become 
disadvantaged within the criminal justice system simply because his or 
her doctor failed to provide an accurate assessment of the potential 
cause of the veteran’s disabling conditions or because the veteran 
received a poor-quality review from a VA employee. Furthermore, 
gross injustices would result if justice-involved veterans who 
legitimately could not afford to receive a medical examination were 
penalized by being barred from a Veterans Treatment Court’s 
assistance—including services that would obtain the medical treatment 
and care that those veterans need.  
Of course, a Veterans Treatment Court may use the presence or 
absence of a service-connected disability as one of several criteria for 
determining a justice-involved veteran’s eligibility. Yet these courts go 
too far when they establish an absolute ban on all veterans who cannot 
prove that they have a service-connected disability that caused them to 
commit the crime(s) that brought them into contact with the criminal 
justice system. This automatic rejection of any veteran who cannot 
satisfy a causal nexus requirement is not rationally related to a 
271 Holoszyc-Pimentel, supra note 96, at 2102.  
272 McGowan, supra note 123, at 389–94.  
273 Id.  
274 See supra notes 256–61.  
275 See TANIELIAN ET AL., supra note 266, at 46.  
276 Zarembo, supra note 263; Shane III, supra note 262. 
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legitimate government interest and thus could be found in violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause by a court applying rational basis with bite. 
D. Offense-Specific Classifications
Virtually all Veterans Treatment Courts refuse to permit veterans 
charged with certain crimes to participate in their treatment 
programs.277 Depending on the jurisdiction, the list of barred crimes 
ranges broadly, potentially encompassing everything from homicide 
and rape to lower-level assault crimes, weapons possession cases, and 
drunken driving offenses.278 The rationales behind these offense-
specific classifications focus on the societal determination that certain 
types of crimes do not warrant a second chance for the perpetrator, 
regardless of any other underlying circumstances.279 
In many instances, these crime-specific automatic bans will easily 
satisfy any Equal Protection Clause review.280 Public safety 
justifications should suffice for the majority of offenses that Veterans 
Treatment Courts customarily reject.281 One can reasonably see little 
chance of a successful Equal Protection Clause challenge to a 
government action that prevents justice-involved veterans who are 
charged with homicide, kidnapping, rape, acts of terrorism, and other 
similarly heinous crimes from accessing Veterans Treatment Court 
services.282 Likewise, rationales that focus on guarding against repeat 
277 Arno, supra note 8, at 1047–48; Baldwin, supra note 13, at 742; Cartwright, supra 
note 3, at 311–12; Adam Meyer, Veterans Treatment Courts in Kentucky: Their Successes, 
Their Shortcomings, and What Kentucky Can Do to Further Rehabilitate Veterans, 
105 KY. L.J. ONLINE (Nov. 22, 2017), http://www.kentuckylawjournal.org/index.php/ 
2017/11/22/veterans-treatment-courts-in-kentucky-their-success-their-shortcomings-and-
what-kentucky-can-do-to-further-rehabilitate-veterans-2/; Bryant Jackson-Green, Veterans 
Courts: How Illinois Can Help Its Incarcerated Vets, ILL. POL’Y (Nov. 13, 2015), https:// 
www.illinoispolicy.org/veterans-courts-how-illinois-can-help-its-incarcerated-veterans/.  
278 Baldwin, supra note 13, at 742; Shah, supra note 6, at 86, 88, 95–96. Courts that do 
not accept violent offenders echo the original principles established by the Veterans 
Treatment Court in Buffalo in 2008. Meyer, supra note 277. Barring most or all justice-
involved veterans charged with a violent crime also mirrors one of the bedrock principles of 
many Drug Treatment Courts. Arno, supra note 8, at 1055–56.  
279 See, e.g., Kravetz, supra note 52.  
280 See supra notes 277–79.  
281 See, e.g., Belzer, supra note 103, at 345, 350–51 (discussing the enhanced likelihood 
of success for the government in Equal Protection Clause cases where objective matters of 
public safety are at issue).  
282 Already, plenty of Veterans Treatment Courts exclude justice-involved veterans who 
are charged with such crimes without facing any notable Equal Protection Clause 
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offenders who can pose a danger to society will probably also defeat 
Equal Protection Clause arguments regarding Veterans Treatment 
Courts that refuse to accept cases of justice-involved veterans with 
multiple prior convictions.283  
Under some circumstances, however, these absolute barriers become 
considerably harder to rationally justify. One of the most problematic 
areas involves Veterans Treatment Courts that refuse to accept cases 
involving the illegal possession of a firearm, even when there is no 
violence or threat of violence involved.284 Certainly, the illegal 
possession of a weapon is not a matter that anyone should ever take 
lightly, but special circumstances related to military service might 
make a veteran facing a simple weapons possession charge an ideal 
candidate for a Veterans Treatment Court.285 In the military, carrying 
a loaded firearm is often a mandatory condition of daily readiness.286 
For women and men who serve in a combat zone, the presence of a 
weapon on their person is a particularly crucial act of survival.287 
Requiring a veteran to immediately snap back to civilian life where 
possessing a weapon on a daily basis is no longer needed—or, in some 
cases, no longer allowed at all—may not be a reasonable expectation 
for all veterans.288 In the words of one New York attorney who 
challenges. See Baldwin, supra note 13, at 742; Meyer, supra note 277; Shah, supra note 6, 
at 88; Jackson-Green, supra note 277. 
283 See Nicole Richter, A Standard for “Class of One” Claims Under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: Protecting Victims of Non-Class Based 
Discrimination from Vindictive State Action, 35 VAL. U. L. REV. 197, 209 n.86 (2000) 
(demonstrating the high historical likelihood of success for the government when employing 
public safety as a rationale for unequal treatment of individuals).  
284 See U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF., VETERANS COURT INVENTORY 2016 UPDATE 4 
(2017), https://www.va.gov/HOMELESS/docs/VJO/2016-Veterans-Court-Inventory-
Update-VJO-Fact-Sheet.pdf (stating that one-fifth of the Veterans Treatment Courts in the 
United States currently accept only justice-involved veterans charged with misdemeanor 
offenses, a category that will likely exclude some, if not all, veterans facing illegal 
possession of firearms charges); Amy Fairweather, Guy Gambill & Glenna Tinney, 
Veterans in the Justice System: Treatment of Violent Offenders, DAILY J. (Aug. 17, 2010), 
https://www.bwjp.org/assets/documents/pdfs/veterans_in_the_justice_system_treatment_ 
of_violent_offenders.pdf (discussing the ongoing debate among justice system professionals 
and veterans’ advocates regarding whether to prohibit veterans charged with illegal 
possession of firearms from Veterans Treatment Courts).  
285 See Cartwright, supra note 3, at 309. 
286 See id. at 300 (listing “carrying weapons at all times” as one of the behaviors which, 
while often necessary on active duty, can lead a veteran into trouble after discharge).  
287 See id.  
288 See Arno, supra note 8, at 1061 (quoting Joel Warner, Can a Veterans Court Help 
Former GIs Find Justice Here at Home?, WESTWORD (Feb. 4, 2010), http://westword. 
com/2010-02-04/news/can-a-veterans-court-help-former-gis-find-justice-here-at-hom/ 
2019] Rational Justice: Equal Protection Problems Amid Veterans 469 
Treatment Court Eligibility Categorizations
previously served in combat, “Yesterday, when I was in uniform, not 
carrying my weapon with me meant disobeying my commanding 
officer. Today, as a newly discharged veteran, carrying my weapon 
with me can mean a Class C felony.”289  
Adding to the equation is the fact that hypervigilance and fear 
against unseen enemies are among the most common symptoms of 
PTSD.290 Therefore, a veteran illegally possessing a weapon may not 
be willfully seeking to disobey the law and inflict violence, but rather 
might be using the “security blanket” of that weapon as a mechanism 
for coping with his or her PTSD-induced fears.291 A veteran 
confronting these circumstances could benefit tremendously from the 
services and supports that the treatment team of a Veterans Treatment 
Court can provide.292 Yet, this veteran would never receive the chance 
to access these services and supports if the Veterans Treatment Courts 
in his or her county automatically close their gates to all justice-
involved veterans facing a weapons possession charge.293 By imposing 
this absolute ban, these Veterans Treatment Courts would therefore 
contradict their own objectives of helping at-risk veterans successfully 
return to civilian society.294  
A similar challenge appears when examining Veterans Treatment 
Courts that categorically bar any justice-involved veteran whose 
criminal offense involved some level of violence.295 Without a doubt, 
(“The very skills these people are taught to follow in combat are the skills that are a risk at 
home.”).  
289 Art Cody, Deputy Dir., Veterans Def. Program, New York State Defenders 
Association, Continuing Legal Education Presentation for the New York State Bar 
Association (Nov. 7, 2016).  
290 Reem Shaddad, The Battle Within: Treating PTSD in Military Veterans, 
AL-JAZEERA (Nov. 12, 2017), https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/11/battle-
treating-ptsd-military-veterans-171111124254535.html.  
291 Adrienne J. Heinz et al., Firearm Ownership Among Military Veterans with PTSD: 
A Profile of Demographic and Psychosocial Correlates, 181 MIL. MED. 1207, 1207–11 
(2016).  
292 Meyer, supra note 277 (“But it is precisely the defendants barred by this eligibility 
requirement that are often in desperate need of rehabilitation.”).  
293 See id.; see also Arno, supra note 8, at 1061. 
294 Cartwright, supra note 3, at 312 (“[T]hat requirement [excluding justice-involved 
veterans for illegal possession of a firearm] might exclude a large number of veterans who 
are suffering from serious combat trauma.”); Fairweather, Gambill & Tinney, supra note 
284.  
295 Compare Kravetz, supra note 52 (asserting that cases involving intimate partner 
violence are never appropriate matters for Veterans Treatment Courts), with Cavanaugh, 
supra note 4, at 486 (arguing that Veterans Treatment Courts should consider hearing a 
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the criminal justice system owes a societal obligation to never act 
flippantly toward any individual who inflicts a violent injury upon 
someone else.296 Still, certain additional factors warrant consideration 
when the individual charged with a violent crime is a veteran.297 In the 
words of one author,  
Military personnel train for and conduct violent missions to kill the 
enemy and achieve victory in support of national interests. The 
American military provides sophisticated training for combat that 
influences and shapes the psychology of the young warfighter from 
the moments of first entering active service. The impact and 
consequences of training and engagement in combat profoundly 
influence the attitudes and behavior of servicemembers, raise unique 
risk factors toward violence, and broadly affect military institutions 
and the services.298  
Therefore, beginning in basic training and continuing throughout 
their entire military career, every veteran has received an 
extraordinarily emphatic indoctrination into the methods and 
necessities of using violence to accomplish finite objectives.299 
Without such intensive training methods, military members would not 
gain the high level of preparation necessary to survive and succeed in 
a hazardous environment.300 In other words, the military’s ability to 
defend this nation depends upon complete immersion into methods that 
train service members how to effectively fight and, when necessary, 
how to kill.301 When a service member has to use the violent tactics 
that he or she learned during training to carry out an assigned mission 
in the real world, his or her level of comfort with using violence to 
achieve immediate objectives increases even more.302 
greater number of cases for justice-involved veterans charged with crimes involving 
violence).  
296 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SMART ON CRIME: REFORMING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 2 (2013) (listing the prevention of violence as one of the 
paramount goals of the American criminal justice system).  
297 See infra notes 300–09 and accompanying text. 
298 Stephen N. Xenakis, At Risk for Violence in the Military, 39 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS 
NORTH AM. 623, 623–24 (2016).  
299 Id. 
300 Jason M. Callahan, Why Civilians Don’t Relate to Veterans, TASK & PURPOSE (Nov. 
12, 2015, 5:00 AM), https://taskandpurpose.com/why-civilians-dont-relate-to-veterans/. 
301 Id.; Cartwright, supra note 3, at 309; Xenakis, supra note 298, at 623. 
302 Cartwright, supra note 3, at 309 (“[M]any soldiers [and service members from all 
branches of the Armed Forces] learned in combat to remain hypervigilant and to respond to 
threats with violence. When a veteran returns home, these behaviors can escalate an 
everyday conflict into a violent confrontation.”).  
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The lessons learned during these immersive trainings, and the 
eventual adoption of these violent tactics as a way to survive, do not 
automatically end on the date of a service member’s discharge from the 
armed forces.303 Instead, many veterans require significant time and 
treatment before they are able to reacclimate to a civilian society where 
the violent methods learned and used in the military now constitute 
crimes.304 Therefore, it should come as no surprise that a veteran who 
is still struggling with this transition will respond violently when 
confronted with someone who is or appears to be acting in a threatening 
manner.305 Ironically, when a veteran uses these skills taught by one 
arm of the government and responds violently, another arm of the 
government imposes a punishment that may haunt that veteran for the 
remainder of his or her life.306  
Veterans Treatment Courts can serve as a lifeline for these justice-
involved veterans, holding them accountable for their wrongful acts 
while simultaneously ensuring that they receive the individualized 
treatment and assistance that they need to complete that often arduous 
journey from military member to civilian.307 Taking certain cases 
involving low-level violent offenses is consistent with Veterans 
Treatment Courts’ pledges to employ veteran-specific strategies as a 
way to help rehabilitate the men and women who are still struggling to 
complete their return home to civilian life.308 On the other hand, 
immediately barring all such cases without conducting any further 
303 See, e.g., Nicholas Kristof, When War Comes Home, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/11/opinion/sunday/kristof-when-war-comes-
home.html. 
304 Id.  
305 Id.; McCloskey, supra note 56; Cavanaugh, supra note 4, at 486.  
306 Cartwright, supra note 3, at 300 (“Behaviors that promote survival within the combat 
zone may cause difficulties during the transition back to civilian life. Hypervigilance, 
aggressive driving, carrying weapons at all times, and command and control interactions, all 
of which may be beneficial in theater, can result in negative and potentially criminal 
behavior back home.”). One could reasonably argue that this paradoxical situation is an 
extension of an overall disconnect between veterans and civilians in American society today. 
See Gary J. Schmitt & Rebecca Burgess, What We Don’t Know About Veterans, WALL ST. 
J. (June 12, 2017, 6:42 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-we-dont-know-about-
veterans-1497307334.
307 McCloskey, supra note 56 (“These [veterans] went off to war and as a result of their 
service were damaged, and our job is to restore them to who they were.”). 
308 See supra Part I. 
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inquiry into their specific circumstances flies in the face of the 
purported governmental objective.309  
Under the traditional rational basis test, public safety rationales 
typically produce victorious results for the government.310 For certain 
categories of offenses, however, a statute or other government action 
that automatically bans these justice-involved veterans from Veterans 
Treatment Courts could fall under rational basis with bite.311 When 
contemplating whether a court might employ rational basis with bite 
here, one can again think of Holoszyc-Pimentel’s finding that courts 
are more likely to use some form of rational basis with bite if the 
characteristic of the disadvantaged class is something beyond its 
control.312 Individuals who join the armed forces cannot control the 
intensity of the military indoctrination they receive, nor can they 
control any disabilities or other lingering effects they incur as a 
consequence of this immersive experience.313 Similarly, one can look 
to Professor Eyer’s conclusions regarding the increased likelihood of 
courts applying heightened forms of scrutiny when a classification 
scheme implicates “group or rights-based concerns.”314 If Professor 
Eyer’s determinations are correct, a court could reasonably choose to 
apply rational basis with bite and strike down a law or policy that barred 
an entire group of veterans from Veterans Treatment Court for doing 
precisely what the military trained them to do.315  
Of course, plenty of veterans who committed crimes involving 
violence will not prove to be good candidates for success in a Veterans 
Treatment Court. The same holds true for plenty of veterans whose 
crime involved possession of a weapon. Yet refusing entry to every 
veteran whose offense involved some level of violence or some form 
of possession of a weapon paints these categories of veterans with a 
brush that is far too broad. By lacking a more nuanced, case-by-case 
approach that examines each justice-involved veteran individually, 
these total bans on certain types of offenses can pose significant Equal 
Protection Clause concerns.  
309 Meyer, supra note 277; McCloskey, supra note 56; McMichael, supra note 49; 
Cartwright, supra note 3, at 312; Cavanaugh, supra note 4, at 486.  
310 Belzer, supra note 103, at 345, 350–51.  
311 See supra notes 308–10 and accompanying text.  
312 Holoszyc-Pimentel, supra note 96, at 2102.  
313 See supra notes 295–303 and accompanying text. 
314 Eyer, supra note 132, at 576–80.  
315 See supra notes 295–303 and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION 
As Veterans Treatment Courts continue to emerge and develop 
across the United States, these unique tribunals will gain further 
visibility among the general public. In doing so, these courts will likely 
receive an enhanced level of examination from those concerned that 
these courts are not fulfilling their fundamental mission. Most of the 
time, these criticisms will likely prove to be baseless; the track record 
of Veterans Treatment Courts thus far appears to demonstrate 
consistent substantial success in rehabilitating rather than incarcerating 
justice-involved veterans. These courts save taxpayer dollars and, more 
importantly, save lives by providing individualized treatment and 
mentorship for the men and women who served in the armed forces, 
instead of merely confining them in a jail or prison.  
However, the classification-based distinctions that a significant 
number of Veterans Treatment Courts impose are problematic. Some 
of these classifications risk breaching the Equal Protection Clause by 
irrationally denying certain classes of justice-involved veterans access 
to the services and opportunities that Veterans Treatment Courts 
provide. Given the stark contrasts between entering a Veterans 
Treatment Court and remaining in a traditional criminal court, justice-
involved veterans who are categorically barred from entering a 
Veterans Treatment Court are likely to seek legal avenues to remove 
this barrier.  
The legal hurdles that these challengers must surmount could be 
substantial. Already, courts and commentators have established that no 
justice-involved veteran has an inherent right to enter a Veterans 
Treatment Court program.316 Furthermore, veterans are neither a 
suspect class nor a quasi-suspect class. Consequently, the formally 
heightened levels of scrutiny probably will not apply to Equal 
Protection Clause challenges regarding access to Veterans Treatment 
Courts. Petitioners therefore will be left to face the rational basis test, 
in which the challenger bears the burden of proving that the 
government’s classification-based scheme is not rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest. Historically, courts applying this analysis 
acutely defer to the state, virtually guaranteeing victory for the 
government in any case where courts employ this form of review.  
A more recent trend, however, shows the willingness of the United 
States Supreme Court and other courts to apply a more rigorous rational 
316 Merriam, supra note 24, at 714. 
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basis test in certain cases, a phenomenon that commentators have 
labeled “rational basis with bite.” Researchers have shown that the 
Supreme Court is more likely to use some form of rational basis with 
bite in Equal Protection Clause cases bearing certain characteristics. 
For instance, the probability of the Court using rational basis with bite 
increases when the case involves discrimination on the basis of an 
immutable characteristic or when the classification scheme burdens a 
significant right. A showing of some sort of governmental animus or 
malice toward the burdened class also increases the likelihood of the 
Court applying rational basis with bite, as does a “break down in the 
democratic process” for a group that is “suffering from longstanding or 
existing social stigma.”317  
This Article demonstrated that these common triggers for applying 
rational basis with bite apply to certain classification-based schemes 
that some Veterans Treatment Courts enforce. In particular, this Article 
showed that categorizations based upon combat service or honorable 
discharge from the military could reasonably inspire a court to use 
rational basis with bite rather than the traditional rational basis test. 
Based on the trends that researchers have previously observed, two 
scenarios seem to be worthy candidates for rational basis with bite: 1) 
absolute bans on justice-involved veterans who cannot conclusively 
prove a nexus between their military service and the charged offense 
and 2) instant barriers for justice-involved veterans who commit certain 
types of crimes. If a court decided to use rational basis with bite when 
reviewing any of the four classifications discussed in Part IV, this 
Article illustrated the likelihood of that court finding that these 
discriminatory policies are not rationally related to a legitimate state 
interest and striking down these categorizations as Equal Protection 
Clause violations.  
Ultimately, the deciding factor in these cases would be the purported 
purpose of the rational basis test itself. Veterans Treatment Courts 
certainly can utilize use evidence-based screening procedures to 
determine which justice-involved veterans possess the greatest 
likelihood of successfully completing the court-assigned treatment 
program. These nuanced individualized reviews are an essential part of 
a Veterans Treatment Court’s survival, limiting the docket and 
preventing these courts with limited resources from becoming 
overwhelmed with more cases than they can properly process. Such 
317 Kerska, supra note 127. 
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case-by-case exclusions, provided that they are free of animus, should 
not face any problems under the Equal Protection Clause.  
Automatic and absolute barriers to these courts, however, are 
typically unwarranted and overbroad. These instantaneous bans 
commonly contradict the stated mission of Veterans Treatment Courts 
by rejecting justice-involved veterans who may actually be ideal 
candidates for the services that these courts provide. Mechanically 
barring the doors of Veterans Treatment Courts to certain veterans 
based solely upon careworn and inaccurate stereotypes regarding 
noncombat service, less-than-honorable discharges, service-connected 
disabilities, or the relationships between certain medical conditions and 
criminal offenses simply does not represent a rational application of 
justice. When such categorical forms of discrimination emerge within 
Veterans Treatment Courts, courts reviewing the classification-based 
schemes should overturn these irrational government actions, ensuring 
that the laudable mission of Veterans Treatment Courts is never 
undermined by a failure to institute equal justice under the law.  
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